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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON AVIATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Jason Chun Yu Wong
This dissertation seeks to better understand the sustainable development of aviation
and infrastructure. The first essay uses an instrumental variable approach to examine
aviation’s impact on regional economic outcomes and innovation. Using a novel set of
instruments based on the historical institutional and physical requirements for expanded
air connectivity, I find that a 1% increase in a core-based statistical area’s Global
Connectivity Index is associated with an increase in long-term total personal income
by 1.7% and 6 more granted patents. The second essay provides a new first-cut estimate
of climate change impacts on aviation through increased severe thunderstorm activity.
As a result of projected increases in Convective Available Potential Energy due to
global warming, there is growing consensus that severe thunderstorm environments
will increase in the United States. Using domestic air traffic delay data from 2004-2017
with the registered storm events database from the National Centers for Environmental
Information, I find that the estimated annual cost of additional delays under a RCP4.5
scenario would be in the order of 152.4 million dollars in the spring and 298.3 million
dollars in the summer. The third essay is devoted to energy infrastructure in India,
where it studies the social acceptability of electricity theft using a conjoint experiment
with 1800 households. Consistent with hypothesis, the income and electricity supply
contexts of hypothetical offenders affect the social acceptability of electricity theft.
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Introduction
Humans have long dreamt of flying. The defining moment in 1903 when the Wright
Brothers successfully flew for the first time was a world-stunning success. Ever since
then, aviation continued to evolve: from the dirigible to the propeller plane, from the
dawn of the jet engine to the possibility of supersonic flight. We have been able to
travel faster, fly further, connect to more and more people in all corners of the world,
form new ideas, and work together on new projects. Today, the global airline industry
provides service to nearly every country in the world (Belobaba, 2016). Aviation has
become an archetype of a technological marvel, an engine for economic growth and
globalization, and a subject of international fascination.
However, the might of flight has also brought about additional issues, including
aviation’s increasing impacts on the earth’s climate through greenhouse gas emissions.
As we continue to better our understanding of aviation’s role in climate change, recent
studies have emerged to point at potential pathways through which climate change in
turn could impact aviation through effects on turbulence, transatlantic flight times, and
take-off weights.
This dissertation seeks to better understand the sustainable development of aviation
and infrastructure more broadly. The first essay uses an instrumental variable approach
to examine aviation’s impact on regional economic outcomes and innovation. The
second essay provides a new first-cut estimate of climate change impacts on aviation
through increased severe thunderstorm activity. The third essay is devoted to energy
infrastructure in India, where I study the social acceptability of electricity theft using
1
a conjoint experiment.
Connectivity and Regional Innovation
How do connections enabled by commercial aviation affect long-run economic growth
and innovation? The first chapter studies the effects of aviation connectivity on re-
gional economies in the United States. I construct a novel set of instruments based
on the historical institutional and physical requirements for expanded air connectivity.
To account for the network nature of aviation infrastructure, I use an improved mea-
sure of aviation activity—the Global Connectivity Index developed by Allroggen et al.
(2015). This measure captures accessibility enabled by aviation better than passenger
and departure numbers used in prior work. After accounting for endogeneity, I find
that a 1% increase in a core-based statistical area (CBSA)’s Global Connectivity Index
is associated with an increase in long-term total personal income by 1.7% and 6 more
granted patents. For a CBSA like Myrtle Beach, SC, with a connectivity index close
to the mean connectivity levels of CBSAs, a 1% increase in connectivity would bring
about $218 million in total income over a two-decade period. Finally, I find that the
impact of connectivity on regional economies is significantly more pronounced in the
largest 100 cities, while these effects vanish in smaller cities. This chapter shows, for
the first time, the impact of aviation connectivity on innovation and provides suggestive
evidence for aviation’s role in strengthening agglomeration economies.
Climate Change Impacts on Aviation: Impact of
Severe Thunderstorms
As a result of projected increases in Convective Available Potential Energy (CAPE) due
to global warming, there is growing consensus that severe thunderstorm environments
2
will increase in the United States. While there have been ample studies on aviation’s
impact on climate, the literature on the feedback impacts of climate on aviation is
relatively new. In this chapter, I couple domestic air traffic delay data from 2004-2017
with the registered storm events database from the National Centers for Environmental
Information (NCEI) to estimate the delay minutes attributable to past severe thunder-
storm events. Combining these estimates with the projected increases in the propensity
of severe storm environments, I provide a first-order estimate of the potential impacts of
climate change to the aviation industry via severe thunderstorm-related delays. Under
a RCP4.5 scenario, the estimated annual cost of additional delays would be in the order
of 152.4 million dollars in the Spring (MAM) and 298.3 million dollars in the Summer
(JJA).
Acceptability of Electricity Theft in India
In the third chapter, I pursue a different type of infrastructure as the subject of inter-
est. In India, power theft remains an obstacle to ensuring proper, safe access to power,
where theft is estimated to account for 20-25% of generated power. Social acceptability
of theft constitutes an understudied barrier to curbing theft. Using a conjoint experi-
ment, this chapter studies perceptions of theft in the form of using illegal wires, katiya,
among rural and urban households in Uttar Pradesh, India (n=1800). We find evidence
suggesting that social acceptability of theft is influenced by the income and electricity
supply quality of the offenders; respondents’ own socioeconomic backgrounds do not
affect these results. However, we do not find strong evidence that appropriate pun-
ishment levels chosen by respondents are influenced by socioeconomic contexts of the
hypothetical offender. This suggests that while there exists a sense of social reprimand
for stealing power, desired enforcement of regulations remains relaxed.
This set of essays addresses some of the gaps of knowledge that exist in infrastruc-
3
ture, regional, and sustainable development. Informed by data, this dissertation adds
to our understanding of the role of aviation in our society, in particular, in stimulat-
ing innovation; it adds to the emerging literature on the feedback impacts of climate
change onto particular sectors by studying the impacts of severe storms on air delays;
and finally, it adds to the nuances of infrastructure policy by examining social norms
of power theft in India.
4
Chapter One
Blue-sky Thinking: Connectivity Impacts
on Regional Economies and Innovation
in the United States
5
1.1 Introduction
Although aviation has played an integral role in the globalization of the world economy,
economists have little understanding of how aviation affects regional economic growth
and innovation (Belobaba, 2016; Bednarek, 2016). To date, few studies have shown
the effect of aviation on regional outcomes. Much like other forms of transportation,
aviation provides positive externalities in enabling knowledge spillovers, such as those
through networks and sociocultural exchanges and interactions. But aviation does so
across unprecedented distances. At the same time, aviation provides a local amenity
value for residents who are able to reach other places with ease, and for tourists to
travel to a city and benefit its local economy. The endogeneity between air activity and
regional economics presents a significant identification challenge.
The aviation sector has been estimated to account for 3.4% of world GDP without
accounting for the spillovers (Belobaba, 2016; ATAG, 2014). While it has been observed
that a 5-6% growth in aviation is associated with a 2-3% annual GDP growth rate
worldwide, this only represents an anecdotal relationship—it remains unclear the extent
to which aviation contributes to long-term growth (Belobaba, 2016). In the United
States, the aviation sector is an important part of the economy, accounting for 5% of
the U.S. economy—$1.6 trillion in total economic activity and for 10.6 million jobs
in 2016. Civil aircraft manufacturing is also the top net exporter in the U.S. with
a positive trade balance of $59.9 billion. Between 2012 and 2014, the real primary
output of civil aviation grew at an average of 3.3% per year while the economy grew at
an average of 2% per year (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
The causal effect of aviation on economies remains to be soundly identified. Building
upon earlier studies on investment and return on infrastructure, this paper investigates
the causal relationship between aviation connectivity and regional economic growth
using a new measure of aviation connectivity, a novel set of instrumental variables based
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on institutional and physical constraints, and—for the first time—measures connecting
aviation and local innovation. This research contributes to the empirical work on the
economics of agglomeration and transportation.
Empirical work on aviation and growth poses a significant econometric challenge
due to endogeneity and limited data availability. The most recent work by Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott (2017) was able to exploit variation due to regulatory and tech-
nological constraints, which provided a discontinuity between city pair connections to
identify long-distance impacts of aviation. However, a limitation of this approach is
its restriction to large cities that serve international aviation markets. Secondary cities
serviced by convenient domestic links are not included. Thus, there remains a gap in
understanding aviation’s impact in regional economies, especially domestically.
Other researchers making use of regulatory changes include Blonigen and Cristea
(2015), who used the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act as a quasi-natural experiment to
find significant impact of aviation on income growth. However, it is unclear if the
increase in air activity and competition as a result of the regulatory change is directly
related to a locality’s economic performance in the first place. I provide additional
information on the causal links between aviation and growth in this paper.
Existing approaches adopting instrumental variables focused on employment im-
pacts but painted a mixed picture. Sheard (2015) and McGraw (2015) focused on the
historical plans such as the 1944 National Airport Plan and historical air mail routes
to instrument for future air service. Sheard (2015) found significant increases in em-
ployment shares in tradable services and limited effects on local employment levels.
McGraw (2015) found strongest employment effects in non-tradable businesses and the
professional services sector and no growth in wages. LeFors (2015) used through-traffic
shares to instrument for air accessibility, though the connecting passenger share in a lo-
cality may be inherently correlated with growing hub strength and economic conditions
7
as major airlines schedule more connections.
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, I construct a new set of instru-
mental variables for air connectivity based on institutional and physical prerequisites.
Second, I improve upon measurement by adopting a connectivity measure instead of
using passenger or departure numbers used in prior work. Third, I connect aviation’s
impact to innovation in the form of patent activity for the first time. Finally, I demon-
strate that the positive benefits of aviation connectivity are disproportionately larger
in larger cities. Overall, these results add to the work on the long-run impacts of trans-
portation infrastructure, provide new evidence on the knowledge capital impacts of
aviation, and contribute to the literature on agglomeration economies and transporta-
tion.
To estimate the relationship between connectivity and long-term growth, I consider
the ingredients for expanded air activity based on the institutions and physical require-
ments in the past. In the 1930s and 1940s, the construction and operation of air traffic
control (ATC) facilities were determined by geographic and technological constraints.
Absent navigational computers, radio control and landmarking became essential for a
flight to cross the country. Airports that were en-route between the coasts possessed
significantly more ATC infrastructure. Additional air connections were more likely in
these airports.
Prior work on aviation and regional economic growth has used passenger and air-
craft movement numbers to measure aviation activity. These approaches introduced
significant measurement error because of aviation’s nature as a network. For instance,
the number of departures is biased in explaining local economic growth because these
flights contained transiting passengers. In addition, some cities are better connected
to the world through convenient air links to major cities. To correct for these biases, I
use a novel connectivity measure developed by Allroggen et al. (2015) that takes into
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account routing directness (including transfer time), frequency, and destination market
quality.
I find significant impacts of a city’s air connectivity on its long-run income and
employment growth. I also find small but significant increases in innovation as measured
through granted patents. A 1% increase in a core-based statistical area (CBSA)’s Global
Connectivity Index is associated with an increase in long-term total personal income by
1.7% and 6 more granted patents. Further, I provide suggestive evidence for aviation’s
role in strengthening agglomeration economies, as aviation tends to disproportionately
benefit larger cities.
This research has the potential to inform strategic policies in aviation planning,
including decisions on airport expansion, the addition of new routes, and compan-
ion investments in innovation hubs and business parks. Expansion and investment in
airports are among policy priorities debated in many cities, while some cities debate
constructing additional airports. In the U.S., airports that have reached and exceeded
their designed capacity are undergoing expansions, such as New York’s LaGuardia Air-
port (LGA). Internationally, the third runway expansion proposal for London Heathrow
(LHR) has made headlines in British politics, and the debates continue today despite
the Parliament’s approval for the project (BBC News, 2018). In Hong Kong, the issue
of the third runway expansion also entered the political stage within the Legislative
Council in the past years (South China Morning Post, 2017). Increasing air capacity is
a priority for many, and especially for the airlines, who argue that boosting runway ca-
pacity is necessary in order for the city to remain competitive in tourism (South China
Morning Post, 2016). Clearly, understanding aviation’s impact on regional economies
is of significant policy interest. This also provides prima facie evidence that aviation is
valuable.
An additional example on how aviation connectivity could be an important determi-
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nant of economic growth and innovation is the recent expansion and headquarter search
decisions by large corporations such as Amazon. In Amazon’s Request for Proposals to
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in search for their HQ2, aviation connectivity
was mentioned specifically as a criteria, including direct flights to major cities as well
as ease of access to an international airport as core preferences (Amazon, 2017). Other
major companies, such as Boeing, and other biotechnology firms, have also made sim-
ilar moves or expansion decisions in recent years. Airport expansion advocates have
long justified investments with “if you build it, they will come.”
This research is also relevant in considering the impacts of climate change on critical
infrastructure and regional economies. Recently, the city of Osaka in Japan experienced
severe Typhoon damage to its aviation infrastructure. Osaka Kansai International
(KIX) was flooded and damaged when Typhoon Jebi hit, with traffic of the airport
interrupted for almost three weeks. The interruption affected tourism reputation, busi-
ness connections, and added pressure to train networks and other airports that were
already at capacity in the region (Nikkei Asian Review, 2018b,a). The question of de-
fensive and adaptation investments for airport infrastructure in face of climate change
is becoming increasingly relevant. Understanding the connectivity impacts of aviation
would be of prime importance in justifying policy decisions, especially for vulnerable
infrastructures such as Kansai, which was built on reclaimed land and continues to sink
every year.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I provide the context of the literature
on transportation and growth. In Section 3 I outline two theoretical models motivating
the empirical strategy. In Section 4 I describe the data sources and the construction of




In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, important literature explored the worthiness of
investments in public infrastructure, such as road, highways, and telecommunications.
These work showed that such investments such as in transportation infrastructure have
significant effects on economic growth (see Canning and Fay, 1993; Aschauer, 1989;
Wylie, 1996). One approach to study the effects of transport infrastructure on eco-
nomic growth is to estimate the social rate of return. Using panel data on roadway
coverage as well as regional economic data, Canning and Fay (1993) estimated the re-
turns from investing on U.S. road building. Wylie (1996) found consistent results in
Canada with Aschauer’s work on the U.S. with high rates of return for public infrastruc-
ture investments, and perhaps at even higher magnitudes. Winston (1991) cautioned
against simple spending and argued for efficient transportation investments and pric-
ing on roads and airports using optimal capacity, pricing, and congestion analysis.
The issue of airport capacity, congestion, and pricing was of particular interest as the
U.S. aviation industry had just been deregulated. Allroggen (2013) and Redding and
Turner (2015) offer comprehensive reviews on the broader literature in transportation
and regional economic development.
The relationship between transportation and urban growth has been of renewed
interest in recent years with the advances in identification methods including instru-
mental variable approaches, regression discontinuity, event study, and other reduced
form derivations from general equilibrium models. The emerging literature has studied
highways, railroads, and most recently began on aviation.
Studies on the economic impacts of highways include one by Duranton and Turner
(2012), who estimated the effect of interstate highways on growth of U.S. cities using
an instrumental variable approach, using past highway system plans and old railroad
maps to instrument for observed highway provision. They found that employment
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would increase 1.5% over a 20-year period with a 10% increase in the initial stock of
highways, adding sound empirical basis to the theoretical models on cities and public
infrastructure provision.
Rigorous analysis on the subject of rail provision and urban economic growth also
emerged. Haines and Margo (2008) examined the relative impact of gaining access to
railroads in the 1850-1860 period and found increased urbanization and service sector
employment gains. Donaldson (2018) used archival data in India to study the railroad
network’s impact on regional economies in the colonial era. He found significant de-
creases in income and interregional trade. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) examined
the historical impact of railroads on the U.S. economy, focusing on aggregate agricul-
tural sector impacts in the 1890s. They constructed a network database of rail and
waterways to measure market access and calculate transport costs. They found sig-
nificant impacts of railroad on agricultural land value: removing rail would decrease
land value by some 60%, and such losses cannot be mitigated by a substitute transport
mode such as through canals or roads.
Aviation infrastructure differs from roads significantly. Roads provide fixed connec-
tions between places physically connected to the road, while aviation provide non-stop
or multi-stop connections between airports depending on available routes. Operat-
ing aircrafts, in comparison to personal vehicles, requires much higher entry costs and
economies of scale. Previous work has studied local effects of aviation, such as on urban
growth, labor market, regional output, as well as pollution and health (see, for exam-
ple, Brueckner, 2003; Allroggen and Malina, 2014; Schlenker and Walker, 2016). Other
attempts in establishing causal links between aviation and growth or trade costs have
largely rested on using air passenger or freight volume (see Anderson and Wincoop,
2004; Button and Yuan, 2013; Redding and Turner, 2015). There has also been cross-
sectional analysis using networks (Guimera` et al., 2005). Brueckner (2003)’s seminal
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work offers a cross-section analysis using hub as an instrument and finds that expan-
sion of airports would raise service-sector employment significantly, though whether
hub status is endogenous to regional economies is subject to debate.
The application of instrumental variable approaches to estimate the impact of trans-
portation on regional outcome can be summarized in three broad approaches. First,
one could make use of the past planning of the infrastructure network system (where
the realized form may differ) to generate variation in the observed infrastructure in
the future. Such plans are likely independent of future regional growth. Second, one
could similarly make use of historic routes that pre-date the new transportation infras-
tructure, such as historical transport routes to generate the quasi-random variation in
observed infrastructure. Third is the idea of the inconsequential place or “accidental”
infrastructure, such as a highway placed between place A and B and an exit was created
in between as incidental infrastructure provision, which generates variation in observed
infrastructure in these “en-route” places (Redding and Turner, 2015).
LeFors (2015) made use of through traffic share (i.e., connecting passengers as a frac-
tion of all passengers) and Herfindahl index for the carrier concentration of passengers
departing from the city as instrumental variables for air access for the city. However,
through traffic share could violate exogeneity assumptions because large hubs with
strong economic performances are automatically likely to have higher through traffic
shares due to the hub-and-spoke nature of most of the U.S. air carriers. An important
innovation in this work is the construction of an ”air accessibility” measure, which
was calculated as the weighted average of the populations of every other city, with the
weights being a function of the inverse cost of traveling to each city by air, where costs
include average fare and mileage measures. This alternative measure of aviation activ-
ity is important because of the bias introduced by using passenger numbers or number
of aircraft movements, which ignores the network nature of aviation and overweigh the
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impact of the large hub because transiting passengers’ effects may be included.
However, in the LeFors approach, only realized itineraries and fares are included in
the construction of the air access measure; only Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
pairs within the U.S. were considered; and opportunity cost of time as well as the
network and codesharing features of aviation were not included. This paper instead
employs an improved measure of air connectivity developed by Allroggen et al. (2015),
which was constructed with all scheduled passenger flights, one-stop possibilities with
codesharing and accounting for transfer times, thus significantly improving upon the
measure used in LeFors to capture the potential connectedness through aviation.
Sheard (2014) and Sheard (2017) used the 1944 National Airport Plan in the U.S. to
instrument for current airport size and distribution, akin to the “plans” approaches seen
in the literature studying other transportation mode’s effects on regional outcome. The
use of the airport plan was novel in that the potential planned costs of the airport also
generated variation in the value of the added airport in the future. Flight volume was
the instrumented variable of interest. Sheard (2014) found positive effects of aviation
on service sector employment but no effect on other sectors and Sheard (2017) found
increases in traffic as a result of increases in the number of airports, both using the
historical plan instrument. A potential concern herein is theoretical: using the number
of departures as a measurement for aviation activity suffers from substantial bias as
outlined above, ignoring the transiting passengers and the network nature of aviation.
McGraw (2015) takes the approach of using historical routes as instruments for
future air service. He constructed instrumental variables based on the air mail routes
of 1938 as well as the locations of emergency air fields to instrument airport location
and found significant effects on non-tradables sector employment growth. He found
no effects on wage growth, suggesting the gains through aviation accrued to employers
and businesses but not to employees. A major limitation of McGraw’s approach also
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lies in measurement: the existence of an airport is the measurement used for aviation
activity in this study, which does not account for the network nature of aviation or
the magnitude of the potential connections an airport provides. Using connectivity
measures would improve upon the estimation considerably, as it would capture the
magnitude of aviation activity.
Sheard (2015) used the variation in airport size driven by overall changes in the air
travel network to instrument for air activity, thus employing a Bartik-like instrument.
He instrumented airport size by constructing air traffic categories for aircraft, airline,
and ranges, and then appending national growth onto these variables, whereby the
category growth rates are orthogonal to local factors, particularly when local traffic
growth is being excluded in the calculation of the national time trend.
The estimation of aviation’s impact on regional economies is not limited to instru-
mental variable approaches. Recent work by Blonigen and Cristea (2015) provides a
quasi-natural experiment by exploiting the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act in the U.S.
to study the effects of air traffic changes to local population, income, and employment.
While the authors found significant income impacts among MSAs, the deregulation
could arguably have had uniform effects on all MSAs1, and that the resultant increase
in air activity and competition could be argued to be directly related to a locality’s
economic performance in the first place, placing the identification strategy in scrutiny.
The air traffic measurement focuses on domestic passenger enplanement, which ex-
cludes the connectivity enabled by the network nature of aviation with one-stop flights,
the quality and economic potential of the destinations, as well as the contribution of
international connections to the local economy.
In the most recent work by Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2017), the authors
use a regression discontinuity design that exploits the regulatory and technical con-
1The authors also noted that smaller cities’ air services were reduced but partially preserved
through the Essential Air Services program.
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straints of connecting city-pairs world-wide that are over 6000 miles apart; over time,
direct air connections between cities below this threshold increased but city-pairings
outside of this threshold did not. The authors identified significant, positive impacts
to local economic activity as measured by night-lights, as well as positive impacts to
capital flows. However, while the study is successful in its identification, several limi-
tations remain. First, it would be difficult to understand regional and local economic
impacts of aviation for smaller cities that do not have the requisite size and market to
have direct connections even if they fall within 6000-mile city-pairings. The analysis
is thus restricted only to large international city-pairs. Second, although the approach
does include some network-based measurement of aviation such as network centrality in
addition to the existence of a direct connection between city pairs, it neglects the struc-
ture of commercial aviation and thus the magnitude of aviation impacts on economies,
because frequency, convenience, and one-stop itineraries are not taken into account.
The Global Connectivity Index (GCI) used in this paper does take these factors into
account when measuring aviation connectivity of an airport.
Very few studies have extended the analysis of aviation infrastructure and regional
economies to investigate the potential for knowledge spillovers and innovation. Catal-
ini et al. (2016) studied the effect of the entrance of low-cost carrier Southwest Air-
lines2 on chemistry research collaborations. The authors used a difference-in-difference
framework to find a 50% increase in collaboration between scientists residing in these
Southwest connected city-pairs. These allude to the innovation and knowledge spillover
impacts that are induced by aviation, which have not been quantified previously. A
recent paper by Dong et al. (2018) studies the high-speed rail connection’s impacts on
high-skilled teamwork and face-to-face interactions also using research publications and
2Though not officially a hub-and-spoke airline, it is debated whether Southwest falls into the
category for low-cost carriers today. The point-to-point system still forms focus cities and unofficial
hubs, including Chicago, Denver, and Baltimore, where itineraries are also sold between connecting
flights.
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citations as a measurement for knowledge co-production.
This paper contributes to three stands of literature. First, it contributes to the
broader literature on transportation and urban growth by providing additional em-
pirical evidence from aviation infrastructure. In particular, the paper introduces new
instrumental variables that are based on institutional and physical prerequisites to en-
hanced air connectivity, and uses a measure of aviation that better captures the network
nature of the industry, taking into account the link and destination quality as well as
one-stop flights. Second, it is the first study on the effects of aviation infrastructure on
innovation activity as measured by filed and granted patents, extending the literature
on regional outcomes to measuring knowledge accumulation through enhanced inter-
action. Third, it adds to the agglomeration economies literature by demonstrating the
varied effects of aviation on cities of different sizes, whereas most previous work focused
on large metropolitan areas.
1.3 Theory and Empirical Strategy
Aviation could impact a city’s economy in two main ways. First, the presence of avia-
tion connections add to the amentiy value of a city. Residents have added convenience
of reaching other places, meeting friends and family from afar, and making new connec-
tions in their city via increased tourism. Thus, aviation connectivity enters as a positive
factor in a locality’s quality of life and thus in one’s utility function. Second, aviation
also enhances productivity in several ways. Aviation lowers costs of transfer and trans-
port, especially for perishable products and inputs. Most importantly, it lowers the
cost of interaction between people, thus increasing human capital stock, levels of inter-
actions and exchange, and technology diffusion. Thus, aviation accelerates trade and
agglomeration effects by connecting people, thereby increasing productivity. Glaeser
and Kohlhase (2003) provided a theoretical framework for the significant reduction in
17
transport costs leading to a change in city function - where people meet and contact
one another. Productivity becomes a function of agglomeration as there are returns to
people being able to interact. We add to this idea but amending the model with the
fact that people - who require face-to-face interactions - are now able to meet at lower
costs and at much higher speeds and lower opportunity costs as a result of aviation
connectivity.
Two theoretical frameworks formally describe processes of urban economic growth
and idea exchange prompted by aviation. Firstly, an intuitive argument can be made
that the presence of aviation improves the happiness or utility of people living in the
urbanity, since they have access to aviation services and the opportunity to be con-
nected to another place with ease. For businesses, this means that firms have access
to more markets, more clients, and can readily meet others in the presence of avia-
tion connectivity. Thus, a city’s income (which can be reflected through wages) and
employment levels could be positively influenced by aviation connectivity. Secondly,
we may perceive aviation connectivity instead as an enhancement in the knowledge
sharing process. Having good connections to other places may mean that businesses
are likely to encounter more production-improving ideas; it could also reduce the time
and cost they need to interact with and process different ideas, given that good air
connections exist. Thus, aviation can induce economic growth in the city through en-
hancing this knowledge network. These two different, yet related, models provide the
theoretical foundation of this paper. They each lead to a similar equation describing
the relationship between growth and aviation connectivity, which we estimate in the
later sections.
In particular, the first framework is based upon the set-up followed by Blonigen
and Cristea (2015), which augments Glaeser et al. (1995)’s model by adding air traffic
growth to local amenity and to productivity. Essentially, aviation is seen to provide
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exogenous positive changes in productivity as well as a local amenity that factors into
individuals’ utility function. The simple urban growth model provides a reduced form
equation for growth in population and wages with a linear relationship with aviation
activity. The second framework is based upon Davis and Dingel (2012)’s spatial knowl-
edge economy model that formalizes how interaction and idea exchange lead to trad-
ables productivity. The spatial knowledge economy model is augmented by introducing
aviation connectivity in several ways. First, better aviation connectivity can increase
the probability of tradables producers to encounter one another. Second, better con-
nectivity reduces time spent on interactions, which can be allocated to produce the
higher-value output. Finally, connectivity can be introduced as an endogenous variable
determined by the economic agents.
Urban Growth Framework
This subsection reiterates Blonigen and Cristea (2015) closely in order to provide the
theoretical context to compare the results of employing the connectivity measure in
place of air traffic variables and to check for robustness. Their framework augments the
set-up in Glaeser et al. (1995) by introducing air services as a productivity shifter and
local amenity. We employ the same model but replace air traffic with air connectivity
measure for the metropolitan areas to better capture spatial spillovers.
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) share common pools of labor and capital and
are considered open economies. Differences in regional growth cannot therefore come
from savings rates or exogenous labor supply changes. Cities differ in productivity and
quality of life.
In this framework, the total output of a metropolitan area be given by the level of
productivity within MSA i at time t, multiplied by the labor force raised to a national
production parameter in location i at time t. Individuals earn the marginal product
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of labor as their wages, with normalized output prices. The model also assumes a
quality of life measure that captures socio-economic factors specific to a location that
is declining in the size of the city. Individuals derive utility from their labor income
and the enjoyed quality of life, entering as a product.
Assuming free labor mobility across cities, each individual’s utility equals the reser-
vation utility levels at any city at any time in equilibrium. Thus, utility grows at a
common rate across cities where population growth is adjusted each period to reflect
changes in productivity and local amenities. This means that population and wage
changes can be expressed as log-log equations in terms of changes in productivity Zi
and local amenity Qi in the city i. By substitution, an equation relating growth of
wages and population with city characteristics can be derived. Specifically, proceed by
assuming a vector of city characteristics, Xit, for each MSA i at time t that determines
the growth of both productivity Zit and local amenity/quality of life Qit. Moreover,
the model includes a measure for air transport services as a potential growth driver
for productivity and local amenity, but denoted here cit as the aviation connectivity





















By substitution we may derive the reduced form for log growth rates as:
L˙i = β˜1c˙i +X
′
i,T0
γ˜1 + it (1.1)
W˙i = β˜2c˙i +X
′
i,T0
γ˜2 + ξit (1.2)
with γ˜1, β˜1, γ˜2, β˜2 are to be estimated empirically. The key hypothesis is that improved
connectivity will yield population growth, increases in per capita and regional income
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levels, in employment, and in other measures of changes in regional economic activity;
subject to time-invariant city characteristics. Appendix B details the derivations.
Connectivity in a spatial knowledge economy
In this subsection, I adapt an idea-exchange model developed by Davis and Dingel
(2012) and augment it by introducing aviation connectivity. The model makes explicit
that knowledge gained in interacting with others, in exchanging ideas, is not costless.
There is time-opportunity cost involved. The model also assumes tacit nature of knowl-
edge, requiring physical interaction or face-to-face communication, and as such, cities
are the loci of these interactions. Finally, labor is heterogeneous and continuously
distributed.
The spatial knowledge economy involves individuals consuming three goods: trad-
ables, non-tradable services, and non-tradable housing. The indirect utility function is
given by
V (p, I) = Ic − ps,cs¯− ph,c
where consumers have income I, face prices p in city c, expend on s¯, the non-tradables,
and the remaining income on tradable (numeraire). Consumers are perfectly mobile
across sectors and across cities; their choices of location and occupation maximize
V (p, I).
Assuming non-tradables are produced at uniform levels of productivity, for a mass
of worker L with heterogenous abilities z ∼ µ(z), low ability people in this model will
specialize in non-tradables by comparative advantage. In the tradable sector, producers
can gain knowledge to increase productivity and individual productivity in tradables
z˜(z, Zc) is thus increasing in z and depends on the set of learning opportunities available
in the city, Zc, such as availability to interact with others.
Tradable producers have one unit of time to divide between production (β units of
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time) and interaction (1− β units of time). An agent with ability z produce tradables
output
z˜(z, Zc) = max
β∈[0,1]
βz(1 + (1− β)GZcz)
G denotes the productivity benefits of learning, which is common to all cities to re-
flect gains from interactions. When G is higher, knowledge from interaction raises
productivity more.
The opportunity to learn and interact within a city Zc is determined by random-
matching processes where producers take time to encounter and exchange ideas, and
we augment the original model with the connectivity of the city to other places (thus
have higher exposure to possible ideas). Thus, Zc is defined as follows:
Zc ≡ m(Mc, Ac)z¯c
where m the probability of encounter and an increasing function of its two arguments,
Mc the total time spent by producers in interacting, Ac denotes the aviation connectivity
measure for the city, z¯c the city’s expected ability levels.
With this augmentation we treat Ac as an exogenous feature of the city c not
determined by consumers or producers in this model. We can proceed to solve for the
equilibrium in the set of cities with population L for the equilibrium prices, locations,
time spent on sectors, occupations.
In the above augmentation we treat aviation as having no effect on the choice of
time to interact: aviation simply improved probability of encounters. However, one
can expect improved connectivity also reduces the time producers need to interact for
exchanges. So in the next modification we further introduce aviation as a factor that
reduces the total time spent interacting, i.e.
Mc = f(L, β, µ(z, c), Ac)
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This means that more time can be spent on production with higher connectivity in
addition to aviation providing more amenity in city c. This leads to higher output
levels.
Finally, an ideal augmentation would introduce aviation as an endogenous variable
by adding air services as a sector. This is likely to complicate the model and be difficult
to solve, but essentially the air sector produces products that add to local amenity as
well as reduces tradables’ production and interaction costs. Thus, the economy will
allocate efficiently the ideal proportions of labor to each sector to maximize output.
Multiple equilibria is expected.
With the equilibria in mind, we specify a linear model of Zc as follows:
Zc = γ0 + γ1Ac + γ2Mc(z¯c) +X
′
c~γ + c
where Ac denotes the aviation connectivity measure for the city, Mc(z¯c) the total time
spent by producers in interacting, which is an increasing function of the city’s expected
ability, Xc the vector of city-characteristics that determine whether a positive learning
environment is provided, and c the error that also captures the stochastic idea matching
process.
Further, let us assume that patent registration to be a measure of an idea’s fruition
(Zc) and labor effort in the research and development (R&D) departments/sectors as
Mc(z¯c). We can then empirically estimate the coefficients γ. This means that we es-
timate, in the cross-section, whether aviation connectivity, investment in R&D efforts,
and various city-based qualities affect the learning environment - the number of patents
registered in the particular city c. The expected sign of γ1 is positive, to reflect that
innovation (and thus the spatial knowledge economy) is positively stimulated by im-
proved air connectivity. Holding all else constant, the equilibrium conditions include
aviation connectivity, where increases in Ac should, ceteris paribus, lead to increases in
production of tradables. We also estimate a similar model with growth rates of patents
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and innovation and connectivity changes, whereby the time-invariant city characteris-
tics would drop out. This model thus adapts a spatial knowledge economy to derive a
basic relationship between aviation connectivity and innovation.
Empirical Strategy
The key challenge to estimate the effects of aviation and local development empirically
is endogeneity: clearly, economic growth causes investment in airports, route licensure,
and bid for take-off/landing slots. Such simultaneity thus may bias the estimates for
marginal impacts of aviation on the economy. Using instrumental variables would be
one valid approach, in lieu of taking increased aviation activity as exogenous. IVs such
as historical routes or plans have been considered in the past. Various studies have also
included country and year fixed effects to de-trend macroeconomic environments at
play. Aforementioned studies use flight traffic, passenger or freight volume (McGraw,
2015; Sheard, 2014, 2015; Blonigen and Cristea, 2015)or in rarer cases accessibility
(LeFors, 2015) as the measurement for aviation activity.
Following the theoretical framework, the equation of interest is
yi = α + βci + x
′
2,iγ + i (1.3)
where y is our outcome variable of interest in region i, such as patents, number of
new companies, and quaternary sectoral employment. c is our connectivity measure,
x2,i is the set of control variables and  the errors. Since c is likely endogenous, we
perform 2SLS using an instrument for connectivity. We first regress connectivity on
the instrumental variable z and some other controls:
ci = φ+ ηzi + x
′
1,iδ + ui (1.4)
and obtain predicted connectivity values cˆ. We then use cˆ in Equation (1) where
we regress outcome variables y on the predicted connectivity values cˆ. Identification
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thus requires two conditions - the relevance and exogeneity conditions: one being that
the instrument has to be correlated with our independent variable, i.e. η 6= 0, and the
other being that the instrument must be exogenous to the outcome.
Because of instrumental variable data availability - being a static construction, the
empirical model in this paper takes the following reduced form
∆yi,1990−2012 = α + βci,2012 + x′2,iγ + i (1.5)
The reduced form equation is an regression of the change in long-term (2-decade) change
in income, employment, and patent activity3 on aviation activity as measured by avi-
ation connectivity. The geospatial unit is at the core-based statistical areas (CBSA)
including large and small metropolitan and micropolitan areas. The connectivity mea-
sure at year 2012. c is then instrumented by the constructed instruments, such as air
traffic control status in 1938. The set up allows for robustness test to be performed
using lagged socioeconomic variables (e.g., in 1970) and using selected instruments in
other works (e.g., 1944 National Airport Plan). In the following section, I describe in
detail the data sources and the construction of the new set of instrumental variables.
1.4 Data and Construction of IVs
Dependent variables
The dependent variables of interest include, in addition to the outcome economic vari-
ables cited in the literature, measures for innovation. At the county and MSA level,
business and socioeconomic data are readily available from the U.S. Census Bureau
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis datasets (CA1, CA5N, CA25N, CA30 Regional
Income Data). These variables include population, personal and per capita income,
3Because the patent data is only available up to 2010, we use the change in patent activity from
1990-2010 and the GCI scores in 2010 instead for the patent regressions.
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and employment from 1970-2012. Select variables contain sectoral details and break-
downs at the 2- and 3-digit NAICS code level. The data is then combined with the
geospatially integrated connectivity data at the CBSA level.
As a proxy for innovation we include data includes the number of patents registered
in the region during the time period of interest. A patent database made available
by Lai et al. (2011) contains collated data from the Patent and Trademark Office
(raw registration data from 1975-present) as well as the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s Patent Data Project. The data is at the inventor-patent level with addresses
and zip codes with the granted year of the patent. The data is unique in that we are
able to capture not just the first inventor recorded on the patent but also the addresses
of all the collaborators within the patent. This is particularly relevant for studying
aviation connectivity impacts, as we are interested in the knowledge spillovers and
co-creation. Using this new patent dataset, I geospatially and temporally sorted the
inventors and collaborators by year and CBSA, with zip code to CBSA correspondence
performed using QGIS. Both the sum of all unique patents (location defaulted to the
first-named filer) and the sum of all inventor addresses in each available year were
concatenated. These two measures of innovation via patents granted from CBSAs are
then used as outcome variables to see if connectivity has measurable, significant impacts
on innovation after accounting for endogeneity. The innovation sector data is important
to move beyond looking at semi-direct economic effects of aviation.4
Independent variable: Global Connectivity Index
Networks are increasingly being considered as important frameworks in understanding
various economic behaviors (Guimera` et al., 2005; Jackson, 2014). Network measures
4In future work, I intend to extend the analysis to the collaboration and citation networks of the
patents; in this paper, we restrict the first analysis to the stock of ideas or innovation as measured by
inventor-patent filings and collaborator activity.
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consider the complexity of connections between places or nodes rather than simply
using the existence of a connection or the simple flow between places. Transportation
modes such as aviation inherently enable accessibility, and the nature of aviation as a
network of flights has important implications in how we measure the impact of aviation
in a city.
In the transportation literature, accessibility includes the set of cumulative oppor-
tunities available to a place, the transport costs between places, the gravity of the
destinations, and the utility derived from connecting to these places. Accessibility can




g(Wj) · Iij(τij) (1.6)
The interpretation is straight-forward. The accessibility of place i is a function of the
sum of the set of all possible j destinations’ attractivity g(W ) multiplied by the inter-
action weight between the partners I. The attractivity of a destination can be thought
of as the destination quality, the opportunities it offers economically, or city function.
The interaction weight between the partners is a decreasing function of an interaction
resistance factor τ between the place i and j. If the cost or distance between the two
places are high, such as through increased travel time, less options and substitutes, low
level of directness, then the interaction resistance is high, thus lowering the interaction
weight between these partners (Allroggen, 2013). The accessibility measure captures
how an infrastructure reaches other places, rather than just providing the sheer volume
of traffic.
Allroggen et al. (2015) developed a new metric for measuring connectivity using
route schedules published by the Official Airline Guide with the above accessibility
measure in mind. The data on GCI is available from 1990-2012. Compared to previ-
ous constructed measures, the GCI improves upon the methodology by incorporating
network theory, gravity of destination quality, directness of routes, and sensible oppor-
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tunity costs including transfer time.





where a denotes airport, d the destination airports, r ∈ R a route within the set
of all routings, α directness, f the frequency and w the destination quality. This
new measure offers a better view of the network access of aviation compared to just
passenger volume for example, which gives rise to measurement error by disregarding
connections, directness, layover times as opportunity costs, and destination access.
The are four primary ingredients to the measure: the itinerary between airports, the
frequency and the directness of the routing, and the destination quality.
Itinerary First, whether a link between an airport and another is identified using
Official Airline Guide data. The set of routings derived are distinguished by two
types: non-stop routings without stops and one-stop routings. Multi-segment flights
are treated as separate non-stop connections. One-stop routings are identified with
two scheduled flights and a transfer layover at another airport. Two rules are used to
determine the possible one-stop routing set. A minimum of 30 minutes of connection
time is needed, and only single-airline operated flights or flights with codesharing are
included. Because of strong disutility of connections between completely unconnected
airlines (no delay or missed connection protection, through-bag check, etc.), these are
excluded from the one-stop analysis.
Frequency and directness Second, the frequency of the routing is calculated on
an annual basis using the aggregate number of days on which routing r is operated,
where multiple frequencies are counted as separate days. This reduces seasonality bias
(where some routings see more operations per day in the summer season, for example).
Directness is especially important for one-stop routings and is calculated for one-stop
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flights and then compared to the non-stop flight using the ratio of total travel time
between the routing and the (hypothetical) non-stop. Layover time and flight durations
are included in this consideration, which are both relevant.5
Destination quality Finally, the value of the air connection is also taken into ac-
count, akin to the attractivity in the accessibility model mentioned above. This is
calculated using a distance decay function of the gridded population data from Land-
Scan adjusted for wealth differences and gives a measurement of the relative quality of
the destination market.
The resultant index is available at the non-stop and one-stop levels from 1990-2012.
Allroggen et al. (2015) provides the full detail on the construction of the GCI on a
global scale.
The GCI is then converted into the aggregated CBSA-level connectivity measure ci
by geospatially locating the airports into the CBSA. Figure 1.1 shows the airport-CBSA
correspondence for parts of the United States. The shaded polygons are the shapes of
each CBSA in the United States, and the green icons indicate the airports that are
located within a CBSA. Note that it is possible for one CBSA to contain more than
one airport. In such cases, GCI scores are summed linearly within these CBSAs. Of the
929 CBSAs in the United States, there are 1039 airports that fall within 549 CBSAs,
as there are a number of CBSAs that contain no airports in its defined geography.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the Global Connectivity Index (summed non-stop
and one-stop indicies) for New York City and Atlanta respectively. We make several
initial observations. While Atlanta Hartsfiled-Jackson International is the largest U.S.
airport by traffic, the New York Metropolitan area has the highest combined traffic and
5For example, one can fly from New York to Hong Kong, via Chicago, San Francisco, or London,
amongst other options. The directness is normalized to 1 for the non-stop flight, and the rest of the
routings are compared against the non-stop. Flight duration is going to be highest via London in this
example, thus having the highest detour factor and the lowest directness as compared to the other
routings mentioned.
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passenger numbers. Connectivity is much higher in the New York area as compared
to Atlanta, a three-fold difference - as compared to passenger numbers, where Atlanta
lies between 40 and 50 million and the NY combined close to 60 million passengers
enplaned. This is because of the position of New York as a link to many European and
Asian destinations via direct flights, as well as direct access to large European hubs
with many codeshare partners, which Atlanta lacks in comparison. Using just passenger
numbers would neglect the network nature of the aviation industry and introduce bias
in the effects of passenger numbers in local growth.
While connectivity and passenger number trend similarly, there are marked differ-
ences between them. For example, connectivity decreased significantly in the recession
of 2008-2010, which could be due to a reduction in direct routes to international destina-
tions and the fact that many U.S. airlines suffered significant losses. However, passenger
numbers did not decrease as much, which could be due to the practice of “capacity dis-
cipline” and efforts to increase load factors as means to improve profitability.6 Using
pure passenger numbers thus would fail to account for the actual loss of convenience of
the direct routings that existed at 2007, for instance.
Instrumental variables
While a number of studies in the existing literature have since on constructing instru-
ments based on historical plans or policies, fraction of connecting passengers, concen-
tration of passengers originating from urban areas, or national trends (LeFors, 2015;
Sheard, 2014, 2015; Blonigen and Cristea, 2015), this paper uses historical socioeco-
nomic data to instrument for future connectivity. A valid instrument for the Global
Connectivity Index (GCI) in the present (in 2012) would need to correlate with con-
6U.S. airlines also underwent a subsequent period of consolidation, first with Delta’s merger with
Northwest, United and Continental’s “merger of equals”, Southwest and AirTran, American Airlines
and U.S. Airways, and most recently, Alaska and Virgin America
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nectivity today but not with the outcome variable of interest.
I construct a set of new instruments based on the ingredients and prerequisites to
future air connectivity. First, there are important institutions that led to the addition
of future air connectivity in cities. Aviation safety relied on proper air traffic control,
air traffic control facilities were initially constructed at airports in the U.S. to ensure
air traffic can be directed appropriately. In addition, because of rapid construction and
upgrade of air facilities and storage during WWII, the military also played a significant
role in developing the future air connectivity of many cities. These institutions thus were
important prerequisites for future air connectivity and were unlikely to be correlated
with future economic growth and innovation. Second, there are historical amenities
cities provided in the late 19th century into the early 20th century that may have
provided the initial impulse for air services. The changing structures of the U.S. railways
also created demand and substitution effects with the aviation sector. These historic
amenities thus have effects on the future air service of a city, but the effects of such
amenities need not persist with economic growth. Finally, building and expanding upon
an airport requires land - flat land, open surfaces, a proximity to the urbanity, as well
as existing transport linkages. Historical land use and the natural terrain of a city may
dictate whether it would have high levels of air services in the future.
Instrumental variables: Institutions
Before deregulation of aviation, commercial aviation was run in prescribed routes. The
Civil Airways of the United States was designated in the Civil Air Regulations Part
160, which gives the designated air routes operating at the time. In the early days of
aviation, air traffic controllers stood in a prominent location and used colored flags to
communicate with pilots. These were quickly replaced by light guns, where a colored
beam of light is signaled to the aircraft, which are still used today at most control
towers. Radio control was then added to enable direct communication between the
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pilot and the control tower. The dawn of advanced instrumentation and ground-based
radio navigation aids did not replace air traffic control needs - where most aircraft flew
under the “see and be seen” principle. As airport congestion became an issue and the
risk of mid-air collisions caused fear, air traffic control became all the more important
for the existence and sustainability of an air industry (Nolan, 2011) .
In 1934, the Bureau of Air Commerce was created by Congress to be part of the
Department of Commerce, responsible for the nation’s airway traffic. Of particular
importance traffic control that helped separate aircraft between airports. Airway traffic
control units (ATCUs) were developed initially at the request of the Bureau of Air
Commerce by the airlines because of Depression-era budget issues. In 1937, Department
of Commerce began to acquire the ATCUs and converted them into airway traffic
control stations (ATCSs) with the staff that had been performing air traffic control
in the locations before. Standardized air traffic control rules followed thereafter. The
ATCUs and ATCSs, as well as the radio stations, later evolved and became the air
traffic control centers of the nation (Nolan, 2011).
In Figure 1.4, the Smithsonian archived map of the Civil Airways of the United
States in 1938 documented the ATCSs and radio stations across the United States
(U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Air Commerce, 1938). The existence and
location of control airports were not only in major airports: because air traffic had
to make it between the coasts, and that visual flight rules with radio communication
were the norm, airports located en-route also needed air traffic control facilities. The
map designated the ATCSs, which are among the larger stations first to be converted
to be under Federal control, as well as the existing radio station facilities. The exis-
tence of ATC infrastructure and expertise was both a function of institutions and the
incidental geography that formed the civil airways of the U.S., but should plausibly
not be correlated with future growth and innovation. Using this map in Figure 1.4, I
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constructed binary variables recording the control airport status in a city, as well as the
type of air traffic control offered (ATCSs or radio stations) as well as their operating
frequency, to generate quasi-random variation in future air connectivity. Areas with
existing ATC facilities were more likely to receive higher air connectivity as a result.
This is plausible because ATC development stagnated as a result of the war, and that
the modernization in ATC technologies has been slow. Cities already equipped with the
existing infrastructure and institutions for aviation safety were likely to receive more
connectivity through aviation.
In the years that follow, World War II made a significant impact on American
aviation landscapes. The military used aircrafts to transport people and supplies and
most flights in the nation became military in nature. The federal government exerted
large public expenditure in upgrading airports to serve military needs; airports both
large and small became vastly improved. Military facilities thus likely coincided with
airport existence in order for supplies and troops to be deployed. After the war, many
military air bases and airfields were then designated as surplus airfields. The military
airfields either provided new locations for airports or prompted the construction of new
airports (Bednarek, 2016). A prominent example for an airfield that was converted
into new post-war airport would be Chicago’s O’Hare, replacing Midway as the main
airport for Chicago, thereby increasing the future connectivity of Chicago to meet
post-war demands. Using the U.S. Census Military Installation National Shapefile7 I
construct a proxy for military facilities that are reasonably related to aviation activity
from an institutional standpoint as outlined above. The counts of military installations
are spatially concatenated into CBSAs and summed using QGIS software.
7The data is available for download at Data.gov and at the Census website.
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Instrumental variables: Historic amenities
In addition to important institutions that pre-dated increased aviation connectivity, I
consider the presence of historic amenities, which include old travel destinations and
railway traffic. Historic travel destinations from the late 1800s into the early 1900s
could be argued to provide the conditions for the creation of future air service in these
places first. Just because a place was a destination for tourists in the distant past does
not mean the place would not decline economically in the future, and the attraction and
travel demand could also wane as a result. Therefore, a distant-past measurement of
tourism could reasonably be argued to be exogenous to growth in income and innovation
in the far future. To construct such a variable, I sampled a variety of historical travel
guides for the Untied States as a whole. I use a prominently used travel guide by
Baedeker published in 1904 to construct a variable for tourism in the United States
(Baedeker, 1904). In Figure 1.7 you can see a sample map of New York City found in
the 1904 travel guide. I use a variety of indicators for travel in this old travel guide,
including the existence of a city map, a city chapter, as an origin/destination in travel
instructions, as well as the page span of the mention of the city in the table of contents
to construct the variable for historic amenity in the form of travel.
Next I turn to the historical and early geography work as alluded to by Bednarek
(2016) on the subject of passenger growth and economic development. Taaffe (1956)
was one of the first studies that connected aviation activity and urban patterns, focusing
on describing patterns rather than on demonstrating causality (Bednarek, 2016). Two
of Taaffe’s observations were as follows. First, there are a set of cities that are located
inside another major city’s “traffic shadow,” where residents have a readily available
substitute airport too close-by, thus hindering air service growth there. For example,
Milwaukee sits in the traffic shadow of Chicago and thus would receive less growth
in air services as a result of its location proximity. Taaffe constructed a map of the
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designated traffic shadow versus non-shadow cities, with traffic shadow defined as within
120-highway miles in 1950. The cities that happen not to be located in a traffic shadow
then has the higher potential to grow in air services in the years that followed. Using
these maps in Appendix A2, I construct a variable for whether a city was designated
by Taaffe’s definition of traffic and non-traffic shadow cities as an instrument for future
air connectivity. If cities’ location with the shadow are assumed not to correlate with
future innovative patterns, then we could plausibly use the traffic shadow definition to
instrument for future air connectivity.
The second main observation of Taaffe’s was related to the rail: he posited that
places that received overnight rail service from New York, Chicago, and D.C. were
subjected to the highest level of surface competition. Beyond this zone, air transport
would have a clear advantage. I construct based on Taaffe’s map on rail overnight zones,
as well as an additional dataset from passenger rail service for a variable that included
the overnight rail services and whether rail service was lost or reduced in frequency
between 1962 and 1971. This variable would predict future air service increases due to
lack of surface competition and to the demand to compensate for lost rail service as a
result of rail sector restructuring. The maps used for the construction of these variables
are available in Appendix A2.
Instrumental variables: Physical constraints
Because of the physical constraints of building airports, expanding airports, construct-
ing new runways and terminals, I also include additional physical geography variables as
instruments for future air connectivity, including the average slope within a CBSA using
SRTM digital elevation data calculated in Google Earth engine and historic land use
data (1970) from the USGS. Both datasets were concatenated and averaged or summed
over a CBSA using Google Earth Engine and ArcGIS respectively. If a CBSA has a
very steep terrain and scarce land available for transport infrastructure development,
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then aviation connectivity is unlikely to be high.
1.5 Results and Discussion
The equation of interest is equation 5, the reduced form relationship between long-
run changes in regional economic growth and innovation as a function of connectivity.
I use a two-staged least squares model to estimate the effect of air connectivity on
these outcomes using an instrumental variable approach. The connectivity of a city is
instrumented using a set of historical institutional and physical variables. Table 1.1
reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in the models. The changes
long-term change in socioeconomic outcomes are between a two-decade period from
1990 to 2012; the inventor and patent data are reported from 1990 to 2010. The mean
changes between these two time periods for all CBSAs are presented in Figures 1.8 and
1.9.
In Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the odd columns report the first-stage results as well as
the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) F statistics, in order to show the relevance of the
chosen instruments, generally taken as an F-stat greater than 10, where a high F-stat
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the first stage are not significantly
different from 0. A low F-stat would indicate a potential weak instruments problem,
where the instrument fails to explain variation in the instrumented variable, in this
case, Global Connectivity. The even columns report the second-stage results of the
2SLS model, where the instrumented values for connectivity are used in the model
to estimate the impact of connectivity on regional growth and innovation. In an over
identification model, the Hansen J-statistic is reported, where the null hypothesis is that
the instruments are indeed exogenous. The J-stat p-value helps us determine whether
or not we fail to reject the null to give us results with an exogenous instrument. A J-stat
p-value greater than 0.10 would provide evidence for exogeneity of the instruments in
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the over identification model. These are reported for all second-stage results with an
over identification case in Tables 1.3 to 1.6. Robust standard errors are used.
Table 1.2 considers the outcome variable of income change between 1990 and 2012
with connectivity in 2012. The preferred instruments for institutional prerequisites are
used here, which are the air traffic control variation and military installments. These
instruments are individually demonstrated to be valid in the first-stage. We find a
significant impact of connectivity robust to both specifications of instruments. Take
the example of the first model (results displayed in columns (1-2)), which uses air traffic
control status to instrument for 2012’s level of connectivity. The coefficient of 1245.7
is positive and significant, meaning that the higher the connectivity levels in 2012, the
higher growth in income occurred between 1990 and 2012. Interpreting this strictly
in the linear sense, a city that has a 100-unit higher level of the global connectivity
index can be associated with a higher level of long-term total personal income by up to
$124,570,000. The effect of military installments is qualitatively similar. Employment
level changes were included as controls to ensure that the income changes are not purely
due to more people being employment.
Table 1.3 considers again the changes long-run income. In this specification, we use
additional instruments to include both the preferred instruments above, as well as the
historic amenity variable for tourist attraction as measured by a historic guidebook,
and the initial transport land use coverage in 1970. The two sets of instruments are
valid with F-stats ¿10, and the instrumented GCI has a significant impact to long-run
income growth. Interpreting this strictly in the linear sense, a city that has a 100-unit
higher level of the global connectivity index can be associated with a higher level of
long-term total personal income by up to $217,940,000. In Table A.1 (in the Appendix
A3), I also report the statistics of the Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments.
Table 1.4 reports the second-stage only results, where all columns are using the same
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first stage with three instruments (air traffic control, military installments, and historic
amenity) in an over identification model, with the exception of column 4, where historic
amenity is dropped. Column 1 repeats the results for the second stage in column 2 of
Table 1.3 for comparison. Column 2 uses GMM in the estimation and find a slightly
lower magnitude of the estimated coefficient. Columns 3 and 4 differ by the set of
instruments used for estimating the effect of connectivity on employment changes. I
find a significant and positive increase of connectivity on employment of up to 234 jobs
for a 100-point increase in connectivity levels. The exogeneity criterion for employment
was fulfilled at the 0.05 level. Columns 5-6 report the results for patent activity, with
column 5 the set of all inventors filed or granted a patent, and column 6 using just the
first inventor addresses. I find up to 6 new patents (patent-inventor) for a city with an
increase in 100 points in the GCI, and the effect is positive and significant.
Table 1.5 reports the results on service sector income and employment, as well as
the service sector’s share in income and employment. Connectivity is not a significant
factor in explaining long-run changes in service income and employment shares. I find
significant and positive results for service employment in the order of 192 jobs for 100
point increases in GCI.
Table 1.6 reports the second-stage only results, where all columns are using the
same first stage with three instruments (air traffic control, military installments, and
historic amenity) in an over identification model. The odd columns are for the largest
100 cities by population rank, and the even columns are for the population rank greater
than 300 (i.e., the smallest 268 CBSAs). An important result is shown in this table. For
income, connectivity has a strong positive and significant effect in the largest 100 cities,
but this effect dwindles in the smaller cities, with a coefficient that is 7.5 times smaller
albeit significant at the 0.05 level. Employment level changes are also significant for
the largest 100 cities; the magnitude for the smaller cities is also smaller but with less
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stark of a difference than in the income effect of connectivity. As for innovation, using
the data on the changes in inventors that are included in filed and granted patents, the
largest cities benefit positively in innovation from air connectivity, while the smallest
cities actually see a small negative effect (with the linear model being a poor model
explaining the variation among the small cities given the R2 value). Overall, this
suggests that connectivity impacts on income are far more significant in the largest
cities, and the marginal impact of connectivity is non-linear with respect to city size.
This lends empirical support to the increasing returns to scale to city size for interaction
and knowledge accumulation. The employment impacts exhibit a similar trend but the
differences in magnitude for employment are less stark and perhaps not statistically
different between the larger and smaller city sets. The results on innovation is also
striking in that the largest cities see most of the positive invention benefits due to
connectivity, and the marginal impact of connectivity to smaller cities are close to none
or even slightly negative, lending strong support to the agglomeration economies of
knowledge.
1.6 Conclusion
Commercial aviation is an important determinant of regional economic activity. Ac-
cording to the FAA, some 2.6 million passengers fly in and out of U.S. airports every
day (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). Aviation enables us to interact with
other people that are distant, and new ideas form as a result. Few studies have in-
vestigated the spillover impact of aviation connectivity on long-run economic growth
and innovation. The fact that aviation activity itself is endogenous with local economic
conditions presents a challenge for empirical identification of the causal impacts. I use
a novel set of instruments based on the institutional and physical prerequisites to air
development and an updated measure of aviation connectivity that takes into account
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the network nature of the industry to show the magnitude of aviation connectivity’s
impact on regional economies. I also show for the first time the impact of aviation
on regional innovation as measured by patent and inventor activity. Furthermore, I
find evidence supporting the agglomeration economies. The marginal connectivity im-
pacts on regional economies are much larger in bigger cities and diminish with city size;
innovation impacts of aviation vanish in the smallest cities.
This paper improves upon measurement in two ways. First, the new set of in-
struments focus on the plausible institutional and physical requirements for aviation
development, which had immediate consequences in the operation, financing, and im-
provement of aviation infrastructure. These included the historical air traffic control
infrastructure as well as proximity to military installations, as well as other physical and
amenity factors. The preferred instrument of air traffic control infrastructure demon-
strated exogeneity as a valid instrument. Second, aviation connectivity is measured
using the Global Connectivity Index, which accounts for the network nature of the
aviation industry and reduces bias introduced by using pure passenger numbers or the
number of departures, which may include transiting passengers. In this new measure,
both the link and destination quality are considered. The spillover impacts of aviation
is most plausibly due to the kind of connection one has in a city - not just the sheer
number of departures available.
Using an instrumental variable approach, I find a significant impact of connectivity
on long-run economic growth. A 100-point increase in a city’s Global Connectivity
Index increases the long-term income of a city by $217,940,000 and brings an additional
234 jobs. To provide more context, consider a city like Myrtle Beach, SC that has a
connectivity index close to the mean connectivity levels of all core-based statistical
areas (CBSAs). Given the GCI Index for Myrtle Beach, a 100-point increase in the
connectivity index would represent or require a 1.03% increase in air connectivity. For
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reference, the total employment levels in 2012 for Myrtle Beach was 189,007 and total
personal income was at $12,517,846,000. Applying the marginal effects computed above,
the hypothesized 100-point increase (1.03%) represents a marginal effect of 1.74% in
total income and 0.12% in employment for the mean-connectivity city.
The second contribution of this work is the demonstration of a positive effect of
aviation connectivity on innovation, where a 100-point increase in connectivity brings
about 6 new inventors getting patented, and 2 new unique (first-inventor level) patents.
This provides the first evidence on the innovation impact of large-scale transport in-
frastructure, enabling interactions that otherwise would not have taken place, or would
have been much more costly. Indeed, innovation is not perfectly measured by patenting
activity; many facets of economic complexity in innovation should be considered (see
Hidalgo (2015)).
Of the CBSAs studied, this research also finds evidence to support agglomeration
economies. Large cities have higher connectivity benefits: the magnitude and signifi-
cance of connectivity impacts to the top 100 CBSAs in the U.S. are pronounced; these
effects vanish when we study the smallest of the CBSAs with airports. The magnitude
difference is particularly large in total income and innovation activity, suggesting that
the value added by connectivity is embodied in the value of the knowledge sector and
not the strongest through the number of people employed; employment differences were
notably less stark. This provides evidence to the following: (1) there are non-linear im-
pacts of connectivity to different city sizes and (2) there may be threshold effects of
connectivity—a city will need to acquire a certain level of base connectivity beyond
which connectivity has positive externalities and persistent impacts in the local econ-
omy. These results support the increasing returns to scale of connectivity, knowledge,
and innovation.
This paper provides some evidence to support policies that aim to increase avia-
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tion connectivity in different regions. In particular, the use of air connectivity in this
research implies that cities and regional governments could aim beyond merely increas-
ing passenger numbers or the number of flights. Adding new connections to large hubs
can allow the city to enjoy large connectivity benefits; passengers thereby benefit from
more one-stop flights, lower layover times, and codesharing opportunities. Adding new
direct flight destinations can improve nonstop connectivity significantly, bringing about
connectivity-driven spillover impacts to a region. Regional governments can also sup-
port connectivity-based growth by investing in airport infrastructure (both on-airport
and companion transportation networks), zoning and development of business or tech
hubs, and other companion investments. These actions would lower entry costs and
attract air services. In addition to market demand studies, stakeholders should take
into account the connectivity-driven impacts when considering actions to expand air
services. An example of an airport that has actively worked with airlines to increase
connectivity would be Boston Logan, which has seen additions or revivals of many direct
flights to international destinations in recent years, especially the “long and skinny”
routes as they call them in the industry, long-haul medium demand routes that are
now economical to service using the new Boeing 787s and the Airbus A350s. Airport
incentives and concessions could easily be paid off and justified through impacts in the
regional economy.
Future work could improve upon measurements of innovation and economic com-
plexity and investigate how aviation interact with these factors. Patent and journal
article citation networks are possible avenues of pursuits. The interactions between
raising connectivity, inducing new demand, and competition are also poorly under-
stood; methods in political economy or industrial organization could be applied to
better understand these complexities. Regional inequality and environmental implica-
tions of aviation could also be studied using a modified version of the approach in this
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work. The improved understanding of aviation’s impact in our economy and society is
particularly relevant today, as attention is being paid to the highly international and
emissions-inducing sector.
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Figure 1.3: Connectivity Index and Passenger Numbers: Atlanta
Figure 1.4: Map of Control Airports for Air Traffic Control in the Civil Airways of the
United States (U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Air Commerce, 1938)
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Figure 1.5: Military Installations within the U.S.
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Figure 1.6: Cover of Baedeker’s Travel Guide to the U.S. (1904)
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Figure 1.9: Changes in all inventors and GCI, 1990-2010
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Tables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
∆ Income 917 9391682 3.67e+07 160485 7.11e+08
∆ PC Income 917 21230.48 7172.985 5746 108436
∆ Population 917 68790.63 243730 -108613 2666322
∆ All Inventors 791 286.673 1554.557 -256 25869
∆ Unique Inventors 755 101.679 553.369 -165 9697
∆ Emp 917 43038.9 151761.9 -18091 2006308
∆ Service Y 917 2532183 1.08e+07 -238455 2.19e+08
∆ Service M 917 18924.61 75540.58 -12014 1318711
2010 GCI Sum 549 9987.173 25619.07 0 266668.4
2012 GCI Sum 549 9780.069 26055.13 0 289574.5
ATC Control Airport 549 .117 .364 0 2
Military Installment 917 .812 2.362 0 31
Overnight Rail Reach 66 .788 .713 0 2
Reduction in Rail 115 1.843 1.467 -1 6
Slope 915 3.94 3.666 .409 22.79
% of Transport Landuse 1970 914 .004 .004 0 .026
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.Stage 2012 GCI 2.Stage ∆ Income 1.Stage 2012 GCI 2.Stage ∆ Income
ATC Control Airport 22012.2∗∗∗
(3819.8)
∆ Emp 0.0969∗∗∗ 64.01† 0.110∗∗∗ 76.66
(0.0109) (34.75) (0.0120) (48.09)




SW F statistic 33.21 16.29
SW p-value 1.38e-08 0.0000622
N 549 549 549 549
Partial R2 0.305 0.0886
R2 0.893 0.891
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.2: 2SLS: Change in total personal income (1990-2012) - Preferred Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.Stage 2012 GCI 2.Stage ∆ Income 1.Stage 2012 GCI 2.Stage ∆ Income
Attraction 1069.0∗∗∗ 1292.4∗∗∗
(178.8) (263.0)
Military Installment 770.7∗∗∗ 996.3∗∗∗
(224.4) (215.6)
ATC Control Airport 15172.5∗∗∗
(3275.4)
∆ Emp 0.0800∗∗∗ -4.092 0.0886∗∗∗ -47.66
(0.00812) (32.24) (0.00847) (52.69)
2012 GCI Sum 1818.4∗∗∗ 2179.4∗∗∗
(344.4) (514.7)
% of Transport Landuse 1970 434339.3∗∗
(146873.9)
SW F statistic 22.25 18.71
SW p-value 1.33e-13 1.48e-11
J stat p-value 0.238 0.282
N 549 549 546 546
Partial R2 0.495 0.388
R2 0.874 0.841
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.3: 2SLS: Change in total personal income (1990-2012)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Income ∆ Income (GMM) ∆ Emp ∆ Emp ∆ All Patent ∆ Unqiue Patent
2012 GCI Sum 1818.4∗∗∗ 1336.8∗∗∗ 2.335∗∗∗ 1.839∗∗∗
(344.4) (190.5) (0.550) (0.405)
∆ Emp -4.092 23.52 -0.00204 -0.000332
(32.24) (27.29) (0.00189) (0.000625)
∆ Population 0.443∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0332)
2010 GCI Sum 0.0612∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗
(0.0167) (0.00552)
J stat p-value 0.238 0.238 0.0947 0.0552 0.104 0.172
N 549 549 549 549 496 482
R2 0.874 0.876 0.969 0.972 0.377 0.365
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.4: 2SLS: Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Service Y ∆ Service M ∆ Service Y-Share ∆ Service M-Share
2012 GCI Sum -16.50 1.920∗∗ -0.000000876† -3.50e-08
(72.80) (0.595) (0.000000511) (0.000000164)
∆ Income 0.300∗∗∗ 4.14e-10
(0.0364) (2.69e-10)
∆ Emp 0.238∗∗∗ 1.79e-08
(0.0618) (2.04e-08)
J stat p-value 0.262 0.227 0.249 0.0749
N 157 549 157 549
R2 0.964 0.911 -0.103 -0.00166
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.5: 2SLS: Change in Service Sector Outcomes between 1990 and 2012.
Tourism/Attraction IV for Service Income replaced by Traffic Shadow
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Income ∆ Income ∆ Emp ∆ Emp ∆ All Inventors ∆ All Inventors
2012 GCI Sum 2039.1∗∗∗ 274.9∗ 2.550∗∗∗ 1.948∗
(383.7) (131.0) (0.577) (0.859)
∆ Emp -9.819 62.41∗∗∗ -0.00210 0.00177∗∗∗
(33.16) (12.35) (0.00206) (0.000536)
∆ Population 0.444∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0326)
2010 GCI Sum 0.0622∗∗ -0.00749†
(0.0209) (0.00449)
N 100 268 100 268 100 217
R2 0.847 0.470 0.957 0.646 0.264 -0.0846
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.6: 2SLS Results: Large vs Small Cities - mulitple equilibria?
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
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A.1 Theory
The following reiterates the Urban Growth Framework as described by Blonigen and
Cristea (2015) based on the work by Glaeser et al. (1995) to motivate the causal link
between aviation connectivity and regional growth. This model in particular assumes
aviation enters both as an amenity to individuals and as a productivity-enhancing
factor.
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) share common pools of labor and capital and
are considered open economies. Differences in regional growth cannot therefore come
from savings rates or exogenous labor supply changes. Cities differ in productivity and
quality of life.
Let the total output of a metropolitan area be given by
Yit = Zitf(Lit)
where Zit denotes the level of productivity within MSA i at time t, Lit denotes the level
of population in MSA i at time t. f(.) is a Cobb-Douglas production function and is




with α a national production parameter.





And quality of life captures socio-economic factors specific to a location that is declining




where δ > 0 and Qit a vector capturing the variety of local conditions.
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Individuals derive utility from their labor income and the enjoyed quality of life,
entering as a product:
Uit = WitΛit
Assuming free migration - labor mobility across cities, each individual’s utility equals
the reservation utility levels at any city at any time in equilibrium, so Uit = Ut, ∀i.

























where the left-hand side of the equation is the same for all MSAs. Thus, utility grows at
a common rate across cities where population growth is adjusted each period to reflect



















where κt ≡ log(Ut+1/Ut)/(α− δ − 1), a constant.
The following equation can then by derived by taking annual growth rate of the


















where ωt ≡ (α− 1)κt, a constant.
We will also assume a vector of city characteristics, Xit, for each MSA i at time
t that determines the growth of both productivity and quality of life. Moreover, we
include a measure for air transport services as a potential growth driver for productivity
and local amenity, but we will denote cit as the aviation connectivity offered by the






















By substitution we may derive the reduced form for log growth rates as:








with γ˜1, β˜1, γ˜2, β˜2 the parameters derived from the model structure. We thus now
can proceed to estimate the parameters of interest, β˜1 and β˜2, and hypothesize that
improved connectivity will yield increased population growth, per capita and regional
income levels, employment, and other measures of changes in regional economic activity.
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Figure A.5: Overnight Rail and Rail Replacement - National Assoc. of Railway Pas-
sengers
Figure A.6: Concatenating USGS DS 240: Enhanced Historical Land-Use and Land-
Cover Data 1970 and SRTM Digital Elevation Data V4 - Google Earth Engine
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A.3 Robustness - Additional Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income
Attraction 1069.0∗∗∗ 1292.4∗∗∗
(178.8) (263.0)
Military Installment 770.7∗∗∗ 996.3∗∗∗
(224.4) (215.6)
ATC Control Airport 15172.5∗∗∗
(3275.4)
∆ Emp 0.0800∗∗∗ -4.092 0.0886∗∗∗ -47.66
(0.00812) (32.24) (0.00847) (52.69)
2012 GCI Sum 1818.4∗∗∗ 2179.4∗∗∗
(344.4) (514.7)
% of Transport Landuse 1970 434339.3∗∗
(146873.9)
AR F statistic 19.45 23.01
AR p-value 5.39e-12 4.93e-14
J stat p-value 0.238 0.282
N 549 549 546 546
Partial R2 0.495 0.388
R2 0.874 0.841
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Anderson-Rubin first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.1: Adding Anderson-Rubin (1949) Weak Instrument Test
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income
Attraction 1316.4∗∗∗ 1230.5∗∗∗
(317.6) (252.3)
Traffic Shadow 0 -12020.9∗∗∗
(.) (2728.4)
Overnight Rail Reach 6504.5
(4587.1)
∆ Emp 0.0862∗∗∗ -50.51 0.0835∗∗∗ -29.82 0.0817∗∗∗ -13.39
(0.00968) (56.29) (0.00923) (44.48) (0.0112) (39.54)
2012 GCI Sum 2489.0∗∗∗ 2140.3∗∗∗ 1900.0∗∗∗
(579.4) (484.2) (385.1)
% of Transport Landuse 1970 1025134.0∗∗
(389988.4)




SW F statistic 13.92 14.87 14.87
SW p-value 0.0000105 1.55e-08 1.55e-08
J stat p-value 0.0429 0.0105 0.203
N 65 65 157 157 517 517
Partial R2 0.414 0.436 0.436
R2 0.869 0.854 0.855
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.2: Robustness: Varying instrument sets, including ones in the literature
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income
Traffic Shadow -9108.7∗∗
(3221.6)
Military Installment 1299.2∗ 1532.8∗ 1291.1∗
(584.7) (619.9) (608.9)
Slope 93.70 44.93 1060.6
(588.7) (593.3) (1096.7)
∆ Emp 0.0998∗∗∗ 109.2† 0.105∗∗∗ 30.14 0.102∗∗∗ 28.75
(0.0140) (59.97) (0.0140) (56.88) (0.0130) (36.06)
2012 GCI Sum 920.7∗∗ 1645.6∗∗∗ 1766.9∗∗∗
(344.9) (405.0) (384.8)
Reduction in Rail 1967.2
(2063.8)
Overnight Rail Reach 14405.5∗∗
(5319.2)
SW F statistic 5.158 3.259 3.259
SW p-value 0.00201 0.0243 0.0243
J stat p-value 0.00561 0.0374 0.781
N 157 157 115 115 66 66
Partial R2 0.102 0.0791 0.0791
R2 0.869 0.891 0.910
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.3: Robustness: Varying instrument sets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Service Y ∆ Service M ∆ Service Y-Share ∆ Service M-Share
2012 GCI Sum 8.778 1.138∗∗ -0.000000594 -0.000000231
(72.91) (0.424) (0.000000601) (0.000000230)
∆ Income 0.287∗∗∗ 3.49e-10
(0.0416) (3.37e-10)
∆ Emp 0.324∗∗∗ 4.09e-08
(0.0568) (2.77e-08)
J stat p-value 0.222 0.350 0.195 0.0135
N 517 517 517 517
R2 0.964 0.914 -0.0152 -0.00861
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.4: Sector Shares: Using 1944 National Airport Plan as part of the IV
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A.4 Robustness - Results using lagged income and
population (in 1970) as IVs
Income, population, and per capita income in 1970 can be argued to correlate with
future connectivity, as past income and population are necessary conditions for con-
nectivity in the future through flight routes and connections. However, levels of past
income and population need not necessarily affect future change or growth in income
or in innovation. While recognizing that this may not be the best instrument, lagged
socioeconomic variables are used as instruments for connectivity for robustness.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Income
Income in 1970 0.00220∗∗∗
(0.000604)
∆ Emp 0.0788∗∗∗ -91.66 0.0751∗∗∗ -75.51
(0.00887) (65.71) (0.00872) (57.02)
2012 GCI Sum 2543.5∗∗∗ 2409.8∗∗∗
(611.6) (544.8)
Population in 1970 0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00272)
PC Income in 1970 2.356∗∗
(0.847)
SW F statistic 13.31 20.62
SW p-value 0.000289 2.33e-09
N 548 548 548 548
Partial R2 0.472 0.472
R2 0.790 0.810
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.5: 2SLS Results: Change in total personal income between 2012 and 1990
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ PC Income 2012 GCI Sum ∆ PC Income
Income in 1970 0.00220∗∗∗
(0.000604)
∆ Emp 0.0788∗∗∗ -0.00112 0.0751∗∗∗ -0.00678
(0.00887) (0.00344) (0.00872) (0.00438)
2012 GCI Sum 0.0586∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0368)
Population in 1970 0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00272)
PC Income in 1970 2.356∗∗
(0.847)
SW F statistic 13.31 20.62
SW p-value 0.000289 2.33e-09
N 548 548 548 548
Partial R2 0.472 0.472
R2 0.0260 0.0230
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.6: 2SLS Results: Change in per capita income between 2012 and 1990
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Emp 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Emp
Income in 1970 0.00266∗∗∗
(0.000498)
∆ Population 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.00513) (0.0532) (0.00503) (0.0496)
2012 GCI Sum 2.346∗∗ 2.290∗∗
(0.868) (0.814)
Population in 1970 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.00216)
PC Income in 1970 2.180∗∗
(0.776)
SW F statistic 28.49 34.54
SW p-value 0.000000138 7.55e-15
N 548 548 548 548
Partial R2 0.616 0.616
R2 0.969 0.969
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.7: 2SLS Results: Change in total employment between 2012 and 1990
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Emp 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Emp
Income in 1970 0.00420∗∗∗
(0.000677)
∆ PC Income 0.167† -0.00236 0.0710 -0.0211
(0.0880) (0.410) (0.0692) (0.407)
2012 GCI Sum 6.096∗∗∗ 6.130∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.533)
Population in 1970 0.0210∗∗∗
(0.00295)
PC Income in 1970 3.746∗∗
(1.261)
SW F statistic 38.49 50.59
SW p-value 1.09e-09 7.09e-21
N 548 548 548 548
Partial R2 0.713 0.713
R2 0.787 0.787
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.8: 2SLS Results: Change total employment between 2012 and 1990
67
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ All Patent 2012 GCI Sum ∆ All Patent
Income in 1970 0.00220∗∗∗
(0.000601)
∆ Emp 0.0785∗∗∗ -0.00201 0.0748∗∗∗ -0.00210
(0.00884) (0.00158) (0.00865) (0.00158)
2012 GCI Sum 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0621∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0126)
Population in 1970 0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00270)
PC Income in 1970 2.916∗∗
(1.083)
SW F statistic 13.42 19.72
SW p-value 0.000277 5.81e-09
N 491 491 491 491
Partial R2 0.473 0.473
R2 0.370 0.369
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.9: 2SLS Results: Change in all inventors granted patents between 2012 and
1990
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 GCI Sum ∆ Unique Patent 2012 GCI Sum ∆ Unique Patent
Income in 1970 0.00220∗∗∗
(0.000600)
∆ Emp 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.000239 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.000156
(0.00883) (0.000543) (0.00864) (0.000540)
2012 GCI Sum 0.0124∗∗ 0.0130∗∗
(0.00480) (0.00485)
Population in 1970 0.0112∗∗∗
(0.00269)
PC Income in 1970 3.004∗∗
(1.116)
SW F statistic 13.43 19.76
SW p-value 0.000275 5.74e-09
N 479 479 479 479
Partial R2 0.473 0.473
R2 0.306 0.306
Standard errors in parentheses
Odd columns show first-stage results with Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics
Even columns show second-stage
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.10: 2SLS Results: Change in unique granted patents between 2012 and 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Income ∆ Income ∆ Emp ∆ Emp
2012 GCI Sum 2459.6∗∗∗ 1147.6∗∗∗ 5.808∗∗∗ -0.227
(462.0) (250.8) (0.763) (1.603)
∆ Emp -55.87 -4.721
(43.80) (25.78)
∆ PC Income -1.105 0.269∗∗
(3.495) (0.0873)
N 100 267 100 267
R2 0.797 -2.292 0.698 0.0678
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.11: 2SLS Results: Large vs Small Cities
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Chapter Two
Boarding Soon: Climate Change Impacts




By 2030, the number of domestic and international air passengers is expected to have
doubled the 2012 levels to over 6 billion globally; at the same time, aviation continues
to emit greenhouse gases, bringing about associated local, regional, and global impacts
(Yim et al., 2015). Aviation alone accounts for 2.5% of the fuel combustion-related
carbon dioxide emissions worldwide. Since 1980, the sector’s emissions have been rising
at 3.6% per year (Scha¨fer et al., 2016). The European Union led efforts to curbing
aviation emissions by including intra-EU aviation in the Emissions Trading Scheme in
2008, for emissions accounting to begin in 2012. In the United States, the authority to
regulate aviation emissions is designated under the Clean Air Act. To this date, the
U.S. EPA has yet to issue regulations on aviation emissions.
Recent efforts at the international level to reduce aviation’s impact on climate in-
clude a new global carbon offsetting scheme, the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which was passed by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2016 to implement a global market-based mea-
sure on carbon, where mandatory participation for all ICAO members is to begin by
2027. This scheme, however, applies only to international flights between member states
to ICAO.
There has been a number of studies that assessed the impact of aviation on the
environment and climate. This literature spans local to global health impacts and
includes science and engineering modeling of emissions pathways and associated impacts
(Barrett et al., 2010; Brasseur et al., 2016), as well as estimations of more localized
impacts (e.g., Schlenker and Walker (2016); Wolfe et al. (2014)). As outlined by Lee
et al. (2010) and Brasseur et al. (2016), the study of the radiative forcing impacts of
aviation emissions is of continued interest, as aviation emissions take place at a different
vertical profile than most emissions sources and thus have unique effects. The current
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overall level of scientific understanding of aviation’s radiative forcing impacts remains
low, though advances have been made in recent years. Aviation-specific climate impacts
that have caught headlines in recent years include the radiative forcing (RF) impacts of
contrails and induced cloud cirrus, whose impacts remain uncertain (though improving
from “very low” to “low” levels of scientific understanding (Brasseur et al., 2016)). The
overall assessment is that the radiative forcing of aviation emissions is net positive (Lee
et al., 2010).
While there has been considerable interest in how aviation brings about climate and
other associated impacts, a new question on how climate change in turn impacts the
aviation sector has emerged. There has been a growing body of literature that began
to address this reverse feedback question. These studies include how climate change
impacts clear air turbulence, jet-streams and transatlantic flight times, and take-off
weight restrictions, which in turn affects the aviation industry itself (Williams and Joshi,
2013; Williams, 2016; Coffel and Horton, 2015). These studies consider specific area
of climate science that has made improvements in the level of scientific understanding
and use global climate models and scenario simulations to shed light in how one specific
climate-related phenomenon might in turn affect the aviation industry. They extend
the knowledge of projected future climate changes and couple them to conditions for
flight in order to determine feedback impacts to the emissions-producing sector itself.
This paper assesses the potential operational impacts that may arise due to climate
change by focusing on the impacts of severe thunderstorms, which are projected to
increase in North America. I couple the past severe thunderstorm events data with
actual U.S. domestic airline delay data to determine the minutes delayed attributable
to recorded severe storms. Then, this relationship between past storms and delay is
extrapolated by the latest climate model projections to estimate the potential impact
of climate change on severe thunderstorm-related delays in aviation.
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Under a Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 scenario and a set of con-
servative assumptions, the estimated annual cost of additional domestic delays would
be in the order of 152.4 million dollars in the Spring (March, April, May months, here-
after MAM) and 298.3 million dollars in the Summer (June, July, and August months,
hereafter JJA). Compared to U.S. airlines’ domestic sector profit in 2018, where do-
mestic airlines reported a 2.5 billion and a 2.4 billion in the second and third quarters
(U.S. Department of Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018a), the
annual cost of additional severe thunderstorms of 0.45 billion would be equivalent to a
non-trivial 9.2% of the sector-wide profit.
The results provide motivation for airlines and aircraft manufacturers to continue to
speed up and increase their carbon emissions mitigation efforts, though the issue of free-
riding remains a significant obstacle. Severe thunderstorms is only one of many types
of costly events that could impact aviation operations as a result of climate change.
These estimates could be of significant interest to both policymakers and the airline
business, particularly in long-term strategic planning, technology and infrastructure
investments, air traffic management, and the sustainable development of the industry.
2.2 Climate Change and Aviation: State of
Knowledge
Aviation’s Impact on Climate and the Environment
There has been much research in atmospheric science and aeronautical engineering on
aviation’s impact on radiative forcing through emissions of chemical species includ-
ing carbon dioxide, water, nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides (Wuebbles et al., 2007;
Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). In addition to direct emission effects on radiative forcing,
aviation can affect climate through induced cirrus cloudiness and persistent linear con-
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trails, though the level of scientific understanding is low (Wuebbles et al., 2007; Lee
et al., 2010). Non-CO2 climate impacts and feedback processes due to aviation remain
an active area of research (Brasseur et al., 2016). Aviation’s impact on climate is found
to be a net positive impact on radiative forcing, arising from carbon dioxide, soot, wa-
ter vapor, and NOx emissions, contrails and cirrus cloud enhancement from spreading
contrails, with sulphate and methane interactions being the primary negative radiative
forcing drivers (Lee et al., 2010). Figure 2.1 summarizes the state of knowledge of the
various components deemed to be part of aviation’s radiative forcing.
Aviation’s impact on the environment extends beyond climate impacts. Recent and
ongoing research has elucidated global mortality impacts of 8000 premature deaths
due to emissions at the cruise level that were subjected to strong zonal wind transport.
This is in addition to take-off and landing emissions (Barrett et al., 2010). To assess
the impacts of local emissions, Schlenker and Walker (2016) used east-coast delays to
instrument for west-coast runway congestion and aircraft idling and found significant
contemporaneous health effects as a result of prolonged exposure to pollutants such as
carbon monoxide. In addition to take-off, landing, and cruise-level emissions, aircraft
noise has been among the significant externalities attributable to aviation. Wolfe et al.
(2014) added assessment of noise damages to the environmental impacts literature due
to aviation. Clearly, the negative externalities of aviation are non-trivial and a major
area of research interest to both scientists and economists.
Turbulence and the jet-stream
The body of research on how climate change potentially in turn impacts aviation is new
and growing. An earlier focus was on how climate change could change the strength
of turbulences, which could result in costly impacts including injuries, aircraft damage,
and the need for diversions and cancellations. Williams and Joshi (2013) found that cli-
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mate change is likely to strengthen atmospheric jet-streams that create the conditions
for more intense aviation clear-air turbulence in the winter. Using simulations from the
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) Climate Model 2.1 (CM2.1) coupled
atmosphere-ocean model, the authors found that, in winter times, clear-air turbulence
can see an increase of up to 40% in median strength in certain latitudes and up to 170%
increase in frequency. As one of the leading causes of weather-related aircraft incidents,
this means that with projected climate change trajectories, one can expect more dis-
comfort and negative impacts as a result of more and intensified turbulences. Changes
in flight route planning, measurement and prediction, as well as aircraft technologies
moving forward would be necessary and would incur additional costs.
Karnauskas et al. (2015) extended this research to couple climate patterns and air
travel by focusing on inter-annual variance in flight duration and and climate variability
such as El Nin˜o Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Atlantic Oscillation (AO). They
found that flight-level winds are a main predictor of flight variations; 88% of Hawaii-
continental U.S. variation in flight durations can be explained by a linear combination
of ENSO and AO. Projecting forward the trends in the mean flight-level winds with
phase 5 of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5), the authors showed
that climate change induced changes in ENSO/AO will induce feedback and affect flight
duration variability.
The seminal paper by Williams (2016) shifted the focus to transatlantic flights.
Using the GFDL CM2.1 model to simulate the effects of a doubling of CO2 levels, the
author coupled strengthened Atlantic jet-streams and flight times to calculate changes
in fuel consumption and net costs of climate-induced flight time and fuel impacts. While
east-bound flights between New York and London will be shortened (twice as likely to
take less than 5 hours and 20 minutes), westbound flights will be lengthened (twice as
likely to take over 7 hours). The author projected 7.2 million extra gallons of jet-fuel
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burn per year as a result, thus contributing towards a positive feedback to climate
change.
Take-off Weight and Temperature
Climate impacts on aviation is not limited to upper atmospheric effects. Coffel and
Horton (2015) investigated extreme temperature impacts on airports - particularly high
altitude airports sensitive to temperature changes. Essentially, hotter air is less dense
and would make it more difficult to produce required lift at take-off speed. This means
that take-off weight restrictions would be impacted: above a temperature threshold,
the aircraft must ensure that the weight is below a limit for take-off to be permissible,
or runways have to be lengthened, which may not be feasible in many regions or require
costly infrastructure upgrades. By using 17 general circulation models from the CMIP5
multimodel ensemble to project future temperatures under a RCP8.5 scenario, the au-
thors found that for four airports in the US where a B737-8 aircraft would operate,
summer weight-restriction days will increase by 50-200% by 2070. Coffel et al. (2017)
presented an updated general model to project future weight restrictions across five
common commercial aircrafts and 19 major world airports. Using the CMIP5 Model
RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emissions scenarios, they found that the climate impacts of in-
creased temperatures could mean up to 30% more weight-restricted flights. Increases in
temperature especially in high elevation airports add to the climate change feedbacks
to the aviation sector that have been identified and would incur significant additional
costs to the industry.
Other Impacts: Storms, Sea Level Rise, and Aviation
While there has been ongoing research on the subject of climate impacts on aviation,
major gaps exist. For instance, the issue of sea-level rise induced airport infrastructure
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impacts have not been adequately addressed in the literature beyond individual airport
level reports. Moreover, the literature on turbulence and flight times neglect larger scale
events such as severe storms that cause significant disruption in aviation, incurring large
economic losses and passenger disutility through lengthy delays and cancellations.
The comprehensive set of potential feedback impacts on this sector alone is indicative
of how pervasive the effects of climate change are on economic life, with the potential
to affect an extensive part of the global economy. Considering that the literature on
feedbacks is still emerging for a sector that has been at the forefront of international
attention, it is likely that feedback impacts remain to be thoroughly understood in
many additional sectors.
The focus on this paper is on an additional potential pathway through which climate
change could have feedback impacts to the industry. In 2017, weather delays accounted
for 33.2% of the total delay minutes in U.S. aviation (U.S. Department of Transportation
- Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018b). Given the emerging scientific knowledge
on the increase in potential severe thunderstorm environments with climate change,
this paper seeks to add to the literature on climate impacts on aviation by determining
the potential impacts of severe thunderstorms on air delays.
2.3 Climate Change and Severe Thunderstorms
Recent research based on a variety of climate model simulations suggest that as the
planet warms, the environments favorable for the development of severe thunderstorms
would increase in frequency in the United States (Trapp et al., 2009; Brooks, 2013;
Kunkel et al., 2013; Diffenbaugh et al., 2013; Gensini and Mote, 2015; Seeley and
Romps, 2015; Hoogewind et al., 2017). Although there has been considerable interest
in the trends of billion-dollar weather and climate disasters (Smith and Katz, 2013;
Kunkel et al., 2013), the increased damages as a result of an increased propensity of
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severe weather such as severe thunderstorms remains understudied. Injuries, fatalities,
economic damages, and transportation disruptions occur more frequently with localized
convective storms than with extratropical cyclones. The terms “severe storm” and
“severe weather” are often implicitly understood as events of convective storms (Wallace
and Hobbs, 2006). Clearly, there is a need to consider the impact of increased severe
storms with climate change. Severe weather is of high relevance to aviation because
aircraft cruising, take-off, and landing altitudes are often within the vertical span of a
thunderstorm, where the aircraft would be subjected to strong winds, gust fronts, and
microburst or downbursts that could cause loss of lift and altitude, posing significant
hazards for aviation operation (Wallace and Hobbs, 2006).
Essentially, the aforementioned simulations focused on using ensembles of global cli-
mate models (GCMs) under some emission scenarios to predict the increases in “severe-
thunderstorm-favorable-environments” (STEnvs) (Seeley and Romps, 2015; Brooks,
2013). These models simulate environments where the atmosphere would have the
support conditions for storm-forming to help us understand how warming contributes
to the increase in possible severe thunderstorms.
Severe thunderstorms occur in environments where there exists deep convection,
which could include individual convective cells, groups of such cells to form convective
storms, and larger zones of interacting cells that form mesoscale convective systems
(Wallace and Hobbs, 2006). Two key ingredients to severe thunderstorm formation
are understood to be Convective Available Potential Energy (CAPE) and wind shear




(T ′v − Tv) d ln p (2.1)
In equation (1), the CAPE measured in J/kg of a reference air parcel is given, where
Rd is the dry air gas constant, LFC the level of free convection, EL the equilibrium
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level above which the parcel is no longer warmer than its surrounding environment,
T ′v − Tv the difference between the temperature in K of the reference parcel and the
environmental air at the same level, and d ln p the difference in log pressure levels
(Wallace and Hobbs, 2006).1 CAPE can be understood as the energy per unit mass
that is available for convection across the pressure (altitude) levels within the convective
environment. Per Seeley and Romps (2015), wind shear is defined and calculated as
the magnitude of the vector difference between near-surface winds and the winds at a
6 km above ground pressure level.
Seeley and Romps (2015) used an ensemble of four models from CMIP5 that are
able to reproduce the climatology of storm-favorable conditions (including CAPE and
shear) to calculate twenty-first century changes in the frequency of severe thunder-
storm favorable environments within the contiguous United States. Under RCP4.5 and
RCP8.5 scenarios, the general result is that the models predict increases in the mean
STEnvs in both springtime (MAM) and summertime (JJA), with larger increases in
the spring and one model predicting a small decrease in the summer. For the RCP8.5
scenario, the mean STEnvs increases are estimated to be in the order of 50-180% for
the spring and 40-120% for the summer with the exception of the disagreeing model.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3, as they appeared in Seeley and Romps (2015)’s work, provide the
mean increases in severe thunderstorm favorable environments as predicted across the
different models. Assuming that the fraction of severe-thunderstorm environments de-
veloping into actual storms will be constant in time, we expect to see a proportional rise
in severe thunderstorm events as a result of climate change under the RCP scenarios
(Seeley and Romps, 2015).
Informed by Seeley and Romps (2015)’s results, this paper seeks to provide a first-
1Generally, the integral of the equation represents the area between LCF to EL on the skew-T ln
p plot, which is the plot of radiosone soundings of the vertical temperature and pressure that provides
information on adiabatic lapse rates, condensation levels, and atmospheric instabilities. The derivation
of the equation can be found in Wallace and Hobbs (2006).
79
order estimate of the additional expected delays as a result of a warmer climate due
to severe thunderstorm related delays in air transport. The research questions are as
follows: how many of past delay minutes can be attributed to severe thunderstorms,
and how much more delay can we expect given a set of assumptions as a result of global
warming?
2.4 Data and Methods
There are several challenges in estimating the impact of increase severe thunderstorm
instances on aviation. First, not all storms cause delays, so directly extrapolating
damages from the number of storms expected could introduce significant error without
accounting for the operational dimension. Severe thunderstorms differ from events like
increases in the strength of the jet-stream and increases in temperature for achiev-
ing lift as those events are directly linked to either the unavoidable flightpaths across
the Atlantic Ocean or a physical requirement to safely reach lift conditions. Severe
thunderstorms do not all impact operations uniformly; delays could be a result of ori-
gin, destination, or en route severe weather, or via propagated delays in the National
Aviation System. Severe weather also interacts strongly with local congestion, and
combining traffic models with ensemble of climate models, or training the climate mod-
els to predict delays and operations would be cumbersome. There is also a possibility
to avoid some severe weather by alternate routing and better forecasting, which has
explained some of the decreases in weather-related delays in the past years (U.S. De-
partment of Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018b), though it is
plausible that a ceiling exists in technological improvement.
Second, not all weather-related delays are due to severe thunderstorms; other
weather phenomena could be at play, so directly extrapolating weather-related delays
will result in an overestimation or at an inaccurate one, as the level of understanding
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of climate change’s impact on different kinds of weather events (such as snowstorms,
hurricanes) differ (Emanuel et al., 2006; Emanuel, 2006; Kunkel et al., 2013; Smith and
Katz, 2013; O’Gorman, 2014).
In this paper I adopt the following approach in order to provide a first-order estimate
of the impact of increased severe thunderstorm-related delays in the United States.
To obtain an estimate of the impacts, I first looked at the historical weather-related
aviation operations impacts using past delay data. The U.S. Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS) has been publishing aggregated delay data by airport, month, and
airline since June 2003 under Airline Service Quality Performance 234, which can be
obtained here: https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ot_delay/ot_delaycause1.asp.2
These statistics are used to produce the Air Travel Consumer Report. The delay data
by month, carrier, airport, and year is concatenated spatially, first onto the airport
level, and then county level by year and month (summing all airports within a count
FIPS), using QGIS software and 2017 U.S. County Shapefiles.
Delay causes are broken down into four major categories:
• Carrier Delays
• (Severe) Weather Delays
• National Aviation System (NAS) Delays, including national weather, air traffic
control, congestion, and security
• Late Arriving Aircraft
whereby the latter two categories also contain weather-related delays.
To calculate total weather-related delays, both the count of delayed flights (defined
as flight arrival later than 15 minutes) and the duration of the delay in minutes are
2A more detailed level at the individual flight segment level is also available from the BTS dating
from 1987, though the recorded causes of delay (also) only began in June 2003. Alternatively, the FAA
OPSNET dataset provides detailed operation data by flight segment.
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summed. The total weather-related delay minutes at county i during month m and
year y are summed using the following formula:
TotalWeatherDelayi,m,y = Weatheri,m,y + γm,y(NASi,m,y + LateAircrafti,m,y) (2.2)
The γ-multiplier is the share of delays (in %) that are attributed to weather that is
reported by the monthly weather’s share of NAS delays published by the BTS Airline On
Time Performance Statistics on Delay Causes.3 This multiplier captures the propagated
delay effects without tracking the aircraft movement by tail number. Since the NAS and
late aircraft delay tend to be systemwide issues, the multiplier provides a reasonably
reliable aggregate estimate at the place level. The final weather-related delay minutes
are calculated at the year-month levels, and then aggregated by season (MAM for
spring, JJA for summer). Figure 2.4 shows the average aggregated spring delay minutes
due to weather from 2004-2017. Figure 2.5 shows the average aggregated summer delay
minutes due to weather from 2004-2017.
Second, I obtained registered storm events data from the NOAA National Weather
Service National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) accessible here:
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ftp.jsp. NCEI documents“storms and
other significant weather phenomena having sufficient intensity to cause loss of life, in-
juries, significant property damage, or disruption to commerce.” The data are available
from 1950-2018, where the storm events database is updated within 90 days after the
end of a data month. The data records events by county FIPS level and by event cat-
egory, date and time. In the various datasets available, event locations and estimated
damages are reported using media reports and estimates. These are meant to be broad
estimates.
There are many classifications of meteorological events. The events permitted in
3In principle, the precise delay can be calculated using the detailed segment-based data; but for
the purposes of calculating a first-order impact, the multiplier here is used for simplicity.
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the registered storm data are provided in the NWS Directive 10-1605’s Section 2.1.1.4





• Marine Thunderstorm Wind
• Thunderstorm Wind
• Tornado
The storm events registered by the above codes are summed by county for all years
and months spanning 2004-2017. The spring (MAM) and summer (JJA) seasons are
the objects of focus given the climate projections available for severe thunderstorm
environments. Figure 2.6 shows the average number of registered storm events related
to thunderstorms in the spring and Figure 2.7 in the summer respectively.
Coupling storm and delay data
Finally, I couple past storm events data with air delay data to assess the weather-
induced irregular operations. Storm events data was merged with delay data by year,
month, and county. 44.1% of the observations in storm events matched with delay ob-
servations by year-month-county, for a total of 10,218 storm events at some year-month-
county level corresponding with positive delay minutes. I use this set of storm-delay
corresponded data to calculate the total historical delayed minutes attributable directly
4Accessible here: https://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf
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to registered severe thunderstorm related events. I then apply climate projections per
Seeley and Romps (2015) to extrapolate a first-order estimate of what projected climate
change would mean in terms of delays attributable to severe thunderstorms.
















ηs × TotalWeatherDelayi,m,y (2.4)
where ηs is the model multiplier by season s depending on the RCP scenario of concern.
η for the spring months (MAM) are as follows, taking the average of model extremes
in Seeley and Romps (2015):5
• RCP4.5: η = 47%
• RCP8.5: η = 62%
η for the summer (JJA) are as follows, taking the average of model extremes as
above:
• RCP4.5: η = 53%
• RCP8.5: η = 56.5%
This gives us the estimated increase in average annual total delay minutes at-
tributable to severe thunderstorms as predicted. There are several important assump-
tions made in this calculation. First, we assume that the the translation between storm
5This assumes that the models are equally weighted in this exercise. There are obvious limitations
to taking the average of model extremes; a more precise way would be to apply the increased propensity
of STEnvs directly per grid point onto the storm events registered, which would be computationally
more expensive, but a possible extension of this work.
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favorable environments to actual storms remain constant over time, though other con-
founding factors as a result of climate change are possible (Seeley and Romps, 2015).
Second, we use the long-run average in delay minutes in the extrapolation exercise
as this is the best available information we have on the storm-delay nexus. However,
improvements in operations, forecasting, and air traffic control could reduce the per-
storm delay in the future; at the same time, these improvements in delay could be
offset by increases in demand and congestion, which was not modeled in this estima-
tion. Nonetheless, we can view this as a first-order estimate of the plausible increases
in delay attributable to severe thunderstorms as a result of continued warming under
the different RCPs.
Calculating delay damages
Finally, we take average total increased delays as extrapolated to calculate the cost of
such delays. To calculate the opportunity costs of increased delays, we first divide the
projected increased delay minutes by average annual total number of delayed flights to
yield a per flight increase of delay minutes. This is done to calculate the increase in
passenger hours that are delayed to yield cost estimates.6
Once we have calculated the per flight equivalent increases in delay minutes, we also
would need the total number of affected passengers in order to calculate the opportunity
cost incurred. How many passengers per flight are there on average domestically?
According to BTS, in 2017, there were 741.59 million domestic passengers flying on
8,177,376 operated domestic flights, giving an average of 90.7 seats per flown domestic
flight. For simplicity, we use 90 seats per flight as the multiplier to calculate affected
passenger totals using the average delayed flight segment counts. This assumes load
6For now, we assume no growth in aviation; the delayed minutes extrapolated assumes constant
operations and the proportional increases on flight delay durations. Subject to congestion and increased
demand, the delay costs would likely be higher and the estimates here can be viewed as a lower bound
estimate, barring technological improvements on forecasting and operations.
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factors remain similar in future, though this is also likely to increase.
Multiply now the simulated delayed passenger totals by increased in per flight de-
layed minutes, we obtain the additional delay hours to the economy as a result of
increased severe thunderstorms.
To convert these hours to estimate the cost or damages of increased delay, we follow
urban economics literature on urban transit and congestion per Parry and Small (2009);
Anderson (2014). The work on urban congestion uses a conservative discount of 0.5 for
hourly wages to value time, and further adds a multiplier of 1.8 for congestion nuisance
to reflect the delay disutility, giving an overall factor of 0.9 on average wages as a
measure of increased time costs (Parry and Small, 2009; Anderson, 2014).
Taking $ 24.34 from the May 2017 National Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates United States7, we compute the total opportunity cost of climate change
impacts on severe thunderstorm related delays.
However, the average wage rate may provide a significant underestimation. Air
travelers are likely to be higher earners and therefore may incur higher opportunity
costs of increased delays. In 2004, 18% of air travelers have annual household income
of 100K or more, compared to 10% of the population; 51% of air travelers have annual
household income over 50K, whereas in the U.S. population, only 37% have over 50K in
income (Bouvard and Williams, 2004). It can additionally be argued that the congestion
nuisance factors applied above may be different as they apply to aviation traveler’s
utility functions, as the multipliers were estimated for urban traffic congestion.
The wage rate should therefore be multiplied by a factor 2 to better reflect the
opportunity costs of delay to air travelers. It is important to note that this first-order
estimation is done to generate overall results on estimated costs just by severe thun-
derstorm related domestic delays increases due to global warming, without accounting
7Accessible here: https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes_nat.htm
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for increases in demand, congestion, and adaptation efforts.
2.5 Results
Weather delay accounts for 32-50% of total delays (U.S. Department of Transportation
- Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018b). From 2004-2017, 2.12% of flights were
cancelled and 20.05% of flights experienced a delay of over 15 minutes. On average,
per arriving flight experienced a 11.3 minutes delay on average, and per delayed flight
defined as a delay greater than 15 minutes experienced a 55.2 minutes delay on average.
The calculated weather’s share of delays using the method outlined above (including
NAS and Late Aircraft) accounted for 46.70% of total delayed minutes.
Table 2.1 reports the projected increases in delayed minutes on average under
RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 for spring and summer months due to severe thunderstorm in-
creases. Under RCP4.5, the total increases in delayed minutes would be 2,316,948
minutes or a total of 38,615 hours in the spring, and 4,538,655 minutes or 75,644 hours.
Table 2.2 displays the estimated costs of increases in delay minutes using the method
outlined above for RCP4.5 for both seasons. Under a RCP4.5, the estimated annual
cost of additional domestic delays would be in the order of 152.4 million dollars in the
spring and 298.3 million dollars in the summer using double the average wage times
the multiplier. If using the average hourly wage only, the cost of additional delays
due to severe thunderstorms is 76.2 million in the spring and 149.1 million in the
summer. Compared to U.S. airlines’ domestic sector profit in 2018, where domestic
airlines reported a 2.5 billion and a 2.4 billion in the second and third quarters (U.S.
Department of Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018a), the annual
cost of additional severe thunderstorms of 0.45 billion would be equivalent to a non-
trivial 9.2% of the sector-wide profit during the two seasons.
Table 2.3 displays the estimated costs of increases in delay minutes using the method
87
outlined above for RCP8.5 for both seasons. Under a RCP8.5, the estimated annual
cost of additional domestic delays would be in the order of 201.0 million dollars in the
spring and 318.1 million dollars in the summer using double the average wage times
the multiplier. If using the average hourly wage only, the cost of additional delays due
to severe thunderstorms is 100.5 million in the spring and 159.0 million in the sum-
mer. Compared to U.S. airlines’ domestic sector profit in 2018, where domestic airlines
reported a 2.5 billion and a 2.4 billion in the second and third quarters (U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018a), the annual cost
of additional severe thunderstorms of 0.52 billion under RCP8.5 would be equivalent
to 10.6% of the sector-wide profit during the two seasons.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Weather is a leading cause of flight disruptions, accounting for 32-50% of total de-
lay minutes (U.S. Department of Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
2018b). From 2004-2017, 2.12% of flights were cancelled and 20.05% of flights experi-
enced a delay of over 15 minutes. On average, per arriving flight experienced a 11.3
minutes delay on average, and per delayed flight defined as a delay greater than 15 min-
utes experienced a 55.2 minutes delay on average. Recovery from irregular operations
take time and incurs passenger dissatisfaction, increase in complaints, costs of compen-
sations and alternate travel arrangements, and adds uncertainty to travel expenditures
and time.
The study of the potential impacts of climate change on aviation is recent (Coffel
et al., 2017). Thus far, studies have suggested that as a result of climate change,
clear-air turbulence incidences, transatlantic flight times, and take-off weight restricted
days will increase (Coffel and Horton, 2015; Coffel et al., 2017; Williams and Joshi,
2013; Williams, 2016). As Coffel et al. (2017) noted, aviation can be impacted also
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through climate change impacts on precipitation, storm tracks, increased intensity and
frequency of hurricanes, among other changing weather patterns. This paper provides
a first-order estimation of potential impacts of climate change on severe thunderstorm
related air delays, an area that has not been previously studied but of considerable
interest.
I couple past severe thunderstorm events data and past air delay data to determine
the historical attributable delay minutes related to registered storm events from 2004-
2017. I then extrapolate the delay minutes with results from climate model projections
on severe thunderstorm instances per Seeley and Romps (2015) to provide a first-
order estimate of the potential damages due to additional delays incurred by severe
thunderstorm incidences with climate change. Under RCP4.5, the estimated increases
in delay would cost the economy 152.4 million dollars in the spring and 298.3 million
dollars in the summer on an average year.
This estimation only considers domestic air service in the United States for the
spring and summer seasons under assumptions that aviation activity remains constant
relative to the time period studied. The annual cost with international flight delays
included would be much larger. However, this is still likely a gross underestimation as
domestic aviation is estimated to grow up 2.3% annually between 2018-2038 (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2018). Also, congestion is likely to have non-linear impacts on
delay minutes with increase instances of storms. This estimation provides motivation
for air operators and manufacturers to invest in and accelerate their carbon mitigation
efforts, barring free-riding effects. We have also restricted the study to severe thunder-
storms only to half of the year; the impact of climate change on aviation through other
major delay-causing events such as snowstorms, hurricanes have yet to be studied in
further detail (Emanuel et al., 2006; Emanuel, 2006; Kunkel et al., 2013; Smith and
Katz, 2013; O’Gorman, 2014).
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A limitation of this approach to derive a first-order magnitude estimate is the lack
of consideration of spatial heterogeneity of the increased storm prevalence. Ideally, an
improvement would be to use the model outputs directly from Seeley and Romps (2015)
at the grid level to model overall expected storm incidences in counties in the future.
In addition, in principle one can estimate a model based on past storm and data to see
if and how thunderstorms predict delays in the summer and spring seasons. However,
to yield a more detailed result, storm tracks, wind speeds, precipitation, as well as
flight transaction records based on origin, destination, and flight route may have to be
included, which would be computationally expensive and require the more cumbersome
flight transaction level data. Also, a better understanding of the human decision side
of flight dispatching, routing, and cancellation would be needed in order to specify the
equation correctly. Alternatively, one can also train a delay forecasting model to predict
delays based on past storms, but such a modeling effort will be an ambitious undertak-
ing. For a back-of-the-envelope calculation, this simplified, aggregation-based approach
provides a reasonable first-order estimate that is not sensitive to model specification
and parametrization, and provides ample ground for future work.
An additional limiting factor in this estimation exercise is the consideration of adap-
tation efforts, which can manifest in two main ways. First, improvements in forecasting
technology could help develop alternative flight paths to better avoid severe thunder-
storms en route, thus reducing some of the NAS-related delays due to thunderstorms.
However, the estimation methodology in this paper already only considers the coupled
storm event to airport county location, which means that the majority of storm-related
delays captured are due to origin or destination weather, which is less avoidable than en
route weather. While additional improvements in technology could reduce the burden
of severe thunderstorms on delays, it is unclear whether the net impact between tech-
nology improvements and the increases in demand, operations, and congestion would
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cancel.
Another adaptation strategy is to schedule longer block times as airlines have done at
major, congested airports. However, while this helps some routes ensure on-time arrival,
this strategy is certainly bounded because the longer flight block times, the higher cost
it would incur for labor and the less aircraft utilization would be possible. Given that in
2018, 31.6% of airline costs for domestic operations was on labor (U.S. Department of
Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018a), it is unlikely that airlines
will actively increase block times much to counter the increase in delays due to increased
incidences of severe thunderstorms.
This estimation method could be extended by building a delay/cancellation propen-
sity model with simplified climate models to run scenarios of warming to see how major
weather-related events affect aviation operations. In addition, economic modeling of
passenger utility functions akin to the work on urban transit and congestion related wel-
fare loss should be pursued in order to better model the cost of delays and cancellations.
Regional economic outcome effects are also possible with increased delays.
A major knowledge gap remains in the study of the impact of future sea level rise
and aviation infrastructure. In New York City, LaGuardia and Teterboro airports
are expected to be permanently flooded or inundated. Newark and JFK would face
difficulties in the event of more severe storm surges (Regional Plan Association, 2016).





Spring (MAM) 2316948 3056399
Summer (JJA) 4538655 4838770
Table 2.1: Projected increases in delayed minutes per year by season
RCP 4.5
Spring (MAM) Summer (JJA)
Additional delay (minutes) 2316948 4538655
Average total delayed flights (count) 162519 251159
Per delayed flight increase in delay (minutes) 14.26 18.07
Est. total delayed passengers (90x flight) 1463310 22604310
Est. total additional delayed hours 347780.01 6807664.70
Est. cost (average hourly wage) 7618468.90 149128702.90
Est. cost (2x average hourly wage) 15236937.80 298257405.80
Table 2.2: Projected increase in cost due to delays from severe thunderstorms, RCP4.5
RCP 8.5
Spring (MAM) Summer (JJA)
Additional delay (minutes) 3056399 4838770
Average total delayed flights (count) 162519 251159
Per delayed flight increase in delay (minutes) 18.81 19.27
Est. total delayed passengers (90x flight) 1463310 22604310
Est. total additional delayed hours 458747.69 7259750.90
Est. cost (average hourly wage) 10049326.90 159032103.20
Est. cost (2x average hourly wage) 20098653.79 318064206.40
Table 2.3: Projected increase in cost due to delays from severe thunderstorms, RCP8.5
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Figures
equivalency. Nor do calculations of present-day RF represent the
forcing in terms of integrated RF.
As discussed by Fuglestvedt et al. (2009), there is not a uniquely
correct way to do this, but it depends upon the goals of a particular
climate policy. In the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC it was decided
to use the GWP with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) for this
purpose (see Fuglestvedt et al., 2009, for definition and discussion
of the GWP and other metrics). Recently Shine et al. (2005b, 2007)
have proposed a new emission metric, the Global Temperature
change Potential (GTP), that is designed to serve a policy consistent
with a long-term climate target of constraining the global mean
surface temperature increase below a threshold (e.g. the EU’s target
of keeping it below 2 !C above pre-industrial levels).
Because of the short-lived nature of many of the key compo-
nents of emissions from aviation there are several fundamental
problems of applying global and annual averaged metric values to
these components. However, they can be readily calculated from
the global model simulations (Sausen et al., 2005; Stevenson et al.,
2004; Derwent et al., 2001; Wild et al., 2001; Ko¨hler et al., 2008;
Grewe and Stenke, 2008). Table 13 gives the GWP20, GWP100, GTP20,
Fig. 28. Radiative forcing components from global aviation as evaluated from preindustrial times until 2005. Bars represent updated best estimates or an estimate in the case of
aircraft-induced cirrus cloudiness (AIC). IPCC AR4 values are indicated by the white lines in the bars as reported by Forster et al. (2007a). The induced cloudiness (AIC) estimate
includes linear contrails. Numerical values are given on the right for both IPCC AR4 (in parentheses) and updated values. Error bars represent the 90% likelihood range for each
estimate. The median value of total radiative forcing from aviation is shown with and without AIC. The median values and uncertainties for the total NOx RF and the two total
aviation RFs are calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation. The Total NOx RF is the combination of the CH4 and O3 RF terms, which are also shown here. The AR4 value noted for the
Total NOx term is the sum of the AR4 CH4 and O3 best estimates. Note that the confidence interval for ‘Total NOx’ is due to the assumption that the RFs from O3 and CH4 are 100%
correlated; however, in reality, the correlation is likely to be less than 100% but to an unknown degree (see text). The geographic spatial scale of the radiative forcing from each
component and the level of scientific understanding (LOSU) are also shown on the right (Lee et al., 2009).
Table 12
Aviation radiative forcings for 2000, 2005, 2020 and 2050 in units of mWm" 2. The 2050 scenarios utilize SRES (IPCC, 2000) GDP scenario assumptions of A1 and B2 and two
levels of NOx technology as described by IPCC (1999) and Lee et al. (2009), t1 and t2 (note that totals in all cases exclude cirrus). Key: Sa05 (Sausen et al., 2005); St05 (Stordal
et al., 2005); L09 (Lee et al., 2009).
Year/study RF (mW m" 2)
CO2 O3 CH4 H2O Contrails SO4 Soot Cirrus (low, mean high) Total (ex cirrus)
2000/Sa05/St05 25.3 21.9 " 10.4 2.0 10.0 " 3.5 2.5 10, 30, 80 47.8
2005/L09 28.0 26.3 " 12.5 2.8 11.8 " 4.8 3.5 11, 33, 87 55.0
2020/L09 40.8 40.6 " 19.2 4.0 20.2 " 7.0 5.0 16, 47, 125 84.4
2050 A1t1/L09 76.3 109.8 " 52.0 9.7 55.4 " 16.9 12.1 38, 114, 305 194.4
2050 A1t2/L09 77.7 85.3 " 40.4 10.0 55.4 " 17.5 12.5 39, 118, 315 183.0
2050 B2t1/L09 73.3 76.5 " 36.3 6.7 37.2 " 11.8 8.4 27, 80, 212 154.2
2050 B2t2/L09 74.5 59.4 " 28.2 7.0 37.2 " 12.2 8.7 27, 82, 220 146.5
D.S. Lee et al. / Atmospheric Environment 44 (2010) 4678–47344714
Figure 2.1: Radiative Forcing Components for Aviation (Lee et al., 2010)
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in the spring, the ensemble of high-performing models
predict a consistent response of increased STEnvs ex-
tending from Texas into the southern and central Great
Plains. This region of increase coincides with the current
climate’s spatial pattern of STEnvs—evident in both the
radiosonde and GCM data shown in Fig. 2—suggesting
a ‘‘stormy gets stormier’’ response for springtime severe
thunderstorms. These results agree with those ofD13, who
found consistent increases in severe-thunderstorm envi-
ronments during the spring for a 10-member ensemble of
CMIP5 models. The trends for this season are robust to
the range of greenhouse forcing spanned by the RCP4.5
and RCP8.5 scenarios, with the magnitude of predicted
CONUS-mean increases ranging from 30% to 150% for
the RCP4.5 scenario, and from 50% to 180% for the
RCP8.5 scenario. The fact that the increases for the
RCP4.5 scenario are smaller than the RCP8.5 increases
by 20%–50% suggests that the climate policies adopted
in the coming decades will affect the severity of the
spring thunderstorm season in the United States.
FIG. 4. Changes due to global warming in annual-mean STEnvs during MAM in the high-performing GFDL CM3, GFDL-ESM2M,
MRI-CGCM3, and NorESM1-M. Results for both the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 greenhouse gas forcing scenarios are presented. Changes are
calculated as themean of the period 1996–2005 of the CMIP5 historical experiment subtracted from themean of the period 2079–88 of the
RCP experiment. A summary of the fractional CONUS-mean changes is given for each of the four models in the boxes at left.
2450 JOURNAL OF CL IMATE VOLUME 28
Figure 2.2: Simulated Changes to Severe-Thunderstorm-Favorable Environments,
S ring (MAM) (Seeley and Romps, 2015)
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The summertime response of the high-performing
ensemble of models is considerably more diverse
(Fig. 5). For the RCP8.5 scenario, three of the four high-
performing models predict increases in the range of
40%–120%,while onemodel (NorESM1-M) predicts an
approximately 10% decrease. In all cases, these changes
are concentrated in the central and northern Great
Plains, around the climatological maximum of STEnvs
for the current-climate radiosonde data and four high-
performing GCMs shown in Fig. 3. In contrast to the
spring season, during the summer the RCP4.5 response
is qualitatively different from the RCP8.5 response for
two of the models, changing sign locally in the central
Great Plains for GFDL-ESM2M and in the CONUS
mean for NorESM1-M.
One source of motivation for the present study was
the hypothesis that a restricted ensemble of CMIP5
climate models, selected for its demonstrated skill at
matching a radiosonde climatology of STEnvs, might
display a more consistent response to greenhouse forc-
ing than the larger ensemble used byD13, particularly in
the summer. The results shown in Fig. 5 partially dis-
credit this hypothesis, because the four highest-
performing models identified in section 2 do not agree
on even the sign of CONUS-mean changes in the fre-
quency of summer STEnvs under the strong radiative
FIG. 5. As in Fig. 4, but for JJA.
15 MARCH 2015 S EELEY AND ROMPS 2451
Figure 2.3: Simulated Changes to Severe-Thunderstorm-Favorable Environments, Sum-
mer (JJA) (Seeley and Romps, 2015)
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Figure 2.4: Average Annual Total Weather-related Delay Minutes in Spring (Created
by author using data from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics)
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Figure 2.5: Average Annual Total Weather-related Delay Minutes in Summer (Created
by author using data from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics)
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Figure 2.6: Average Storm Events Registered in Spring (Created by author using data
from the National Centers for Environmental Information)
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Figure 2.7: Average Storm Events Registered in Summer (Created by author using
data from the National Centers for Environmental Information)
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Chapter Three
Perceptions and Acceptability of
Electricity Theft in Uttar Pradesh, India
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This chapter represents joint work with Brian Blankenship, Johannes Urpelainen,
Karthik Ganesan, Kapardhi Bharadwaj, and Kanika Balani. The dissertation author
serves as the lead author for this work.
3.1 Introduction
Power theft is rampant and a serious problem in many countries - in both developing
and developed countries (Lewis, 2015). Theft of electricity occurs in several forms,
including illegal tapping (using illegal nightlines or katiya), consumer meter tampering,
and through billing problems (irregularities with billing or unpaid bills) (Sharma et al.,
2016). It is estimated that electricity theft constitutes 20-25% of the generated power
in India - a cost of INR 20,000 crores annually (Sharma et al., 2016; Gaur and Gupta,
2016). Existing policies have failed to curb electricity theft and remains a focus of the
new Saubhagya scheme, the Indian government initiative announced in 2017 that aims
to electrify all households by the end of 2018. This paper provides a timely study of
public opinions towards electricity theft in order to inform policy design that could
generate better public buy-in.
Although electricity theft is not a new problem for governments and institutions
alike, by and large the focus of existing policies has been on technological and legal
remedies. Thus far, many policy reforms have been introduced without the consider-
ation of the socioeconomics and political economy of energy theft (Never, 2015). The
Electricity Act of 2003 in India, for instance, made provisions for more stringent controls
on electricity theft, with little success. While the new Saubhagya scheme ambitiously
aims to bring connections to all of India, creating new connections alone will unlikely
deter theft completely. In Uttar Pradesh, reward schemes have been introduced to
incentivize distribution company (discom) officials for successful loss reduction or for
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filing First Information Reports1 against theft offenders (UP Power Corportation Ltd.,
2018). To achieve effective compliance with legal electricity use, understanding the
theft problem and the associated social attitudes is crucial (Smith, 2004; Cialdini, 2007;
Never, 2015). In particular, understanding the social norm structures of small crime
that underly theft behavior could prove to be important in designing proper policies to
curb electricity theft.
This paper is the first to systematically analyze the social norm of small crime in an
energy access context. We conducted a large-scale conjoint experiment in 1800 house-
holds across Uttar Pradesh in order to study the social attitudes towards electricity
theft. In our study, we focus on the form of theft via illegal wiring or katiya, while
acknowledging electricity theft can be committed in a few additional ways. Based on so-
cial norm and control theory, as well as studies on the perceptions toward small crime,
we develop new hypotheses on understanding public acceptance for electricity theft.
The social acceptability of electricity theft as a crime is a function of the electricity
supply and income situations, i.e., electricity theft could be viewed as more acceptable
when electricity supply quality is poor and household income levels are low. Where
supply quality is poor, and poverty is rampant, citizens are likely to be more forgiving
of electricity theft as opposed to regions with relatively higher income and better supply
quality. Preferences over in-group membership with respect to religion and social class
could be additional drivers.
We find that social acceptance of electricity theft is indeed context-dependent. In
particular, we confirm that social acceptability of theft as a crime is higher when the
perpetrator has a difficult income and electricity supply context. For a 1000 rupee differ-
ence between perpetrators, the level of acceptability is 3.65% higher for the perpetrator
with lesser income. For a one hour electricity supply difference between perpetrators,
1A type of police report filed for an offense.
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the level of acceptability is 1.3% higher for the perpetrator with poorer electricity qual-
ity. Conversely, where the supposed perpetrators have better income and electricity
supply prospects, stealing electricity becomes less acceptable. However, our results do
not support the hypothesis that there are preferences over similarity in social class,
where we expected respondents to find the behavior of offenders of the same social
class more acceptable.
In addition, we do not find strong evidence supporting that the appropriate pun-
ishment levels for electricity theft chosen by respondents are context-dependent. The
desired punishment levels for power theft is low – on average, between a warning and a
small fine. The socioeconomic contexts of the offender do not seem to affect the desired
punishment levels. This suggests that while there exists a sense of social reprimand for
stealing power, actual desired enforcement of regulations could remain more relaxed.
This set of results have significant policy implications in designing policy reforms
surrounding the question of electricity theft and provide new knowledge in citizens’
context-dependent attitudes towards electricity theft as a crime. Existing policies fo-
cusing on harsher punishment models and stronger enforcement should be revisited, as
they are unlikely to receive strong public buy-in.
3.2 Electricity Theft and Social Norms
Electricity Access and Theft
There is evidence showing that proper electricity access brings about positive impacts
in well-being. Chakravorty et al. (2014) found that rural household incomes increased
significantly with legal grid connections, and this increase was even more significant
with higher quality electricity with less outages. Ahmad et al. (2014) found significant
positive relationships between electricity access and health and education attainment
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in both rural and urban settings. While improving electricity access and quality brings
about positive welfare changes, India, as the second most populous and fastest grow-
ing economy, still does not have reliable energy data, posing difficulties in identifying
sources of electricity supply problems and in designing effective reform policies (Rai
et al., 2017). Aklin et al. (2015) showed that such policy failures have significant im-
pacts on the rural population’s attitudes towards government and their voting choices.
One persistent issue that hinders proper electricity access is the issue of theft.
Power theft is a common occurrence in South Asian countries, and often deemed by
power managers simply as a fact of life in poor communities. Smith (2004) provided
a comparative analysis on the different forms of electricity theft or fraud, including
meter tampering, stealing through illegal connections, billing irregularities, and unpaid
bills. Similar practices also exist in South Africa called the spiderweb and in Mexico
called the diablitos. In India, theft in the form of illegal wiring is the use of katiya.
Electricity theft via katiya consist of rigging a line from the power source’s main line
to where it is needed, which bypasses a meter for billing purposes. In this paper, we
focus on the illegal connections via katiya, While these are visible and detectable kinds
of wire, removal and detection of these lines can still be difficult. First, the wires could
be hidden to bypass inspection. Corruption remains an issue where managers from
utilities are paid to allow the katiya usage to continue. In other areas, officials could
be threatened physically and thereby not able to enforce unless other police security
were present. Gaur and Gupta (2016) and Jamil and Ahmad (2013) provided further
economic analyses of the determinants of electricity theft in South Asia. While stealing
electricity is illegal under the law, when many people in the community practice theft,
such a crime may begin to be deemed as relatively acceptable and form a social norm
(Douhou et al., 2011).
Smith (2004) and Sharma et al. (2016) presented some evidence on the importance
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of utility employee attitudes towards electricity theft enforcement and outline policy
implications of the employer-side of electricity provision. What is understated, however,
is that a social norm of theft underlies employee and citizen behavior. If usage of
katiya with the associated practices of bribe payments become part of a social norm,
we must first understand the structure of this social norm in order to devise proper
remedies to the issue. The focus on technological, operational, and managerial remedies
is not enough to provide better governance (Smith, 2004; Never, 2015; Sharma et al.,
2016). There is also evidence showing that theft activity increases in election years, as
politicians are less reluctant to enforce or support theft rules in hopes of gaining votes
in India (Golden and Min, 2012). In Paraguay, Schechter (2007) studied a different
strategy seen in rural farming villages: the promise of gifts to potential thieves as a
preemptive action to deter theft. They found that trust, familial proximity, and social
networks significantly affect theft behavior.
The standard economic model of electricity theft have major limitations (Jamil
and Ahmad, 2013; Douhou et al., 2011). The expected utility model of risk-aversion
and behavior fails to account for social norm effects that include reputation, morality,
and fairness. Central to understanding theft behavior involves identifying additional
considerations that include these social attitude variables that are often missing in
previous analyses. Our survey attempts to address these deficiencies in the literature.
Social Acceptability
Social norms can be defined as behavior patterns that are self-enforcing (Young, 2015).
When considering the interaction between social norms and small crimes such as theft,
one should understand how the patterns of behavior arise and function, which agents
are conforming, and how this norm is sustained such as by coordination or sanctions
(Douhou et al., 2011; Elster and Jon, 1989). Electricity theft could have became a
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small crime that many commit as it is in the case of some areas of India - and makes it
all the more difficult to resolve simply with heavier punishments. For effective policy
to remove electricity theft as a socially acceptable small crime, norms of cooperation
and reciprocity must be re-oriented. This amounts to altering the norm of katiya usage
into one akin to a coordination game - turning acceptance into effective disapproval and
credible social sanctions, which in turn creates a sustaining behavioral outcome whereby
theft can be eliminated. As we have seen, simply applying a standard expected utility
model with a risk-sanction tradeoff and raise punishment severity as a means to deter
theft has not been entirely effective, which could be due to weak enforcement, other
market and political failures, and the lack of effort in altering the social norm of theft
as a small crime (Douhou et al., 2011; Elster and Jon, 1989; Young, 2015).
There is a limited literature that studies how social norms and public perceptions
of energy interact in developing countries. Never (2015) alluded to the socioeconomic
factors impacting the control of theft in Uganda, highlighting the need for trust, long-
term norm changes, and social acceptances which depend on the political economy of
theft. Using interviews and focus groups, Never (2015) found that informal social norms
in payments for government services, as well as in corruption related to electricity theft,
impact the success of controlling power theft through regulation and social enforcement.
Thus, a thorough understanding of the underlying social norm of electricity theft is
critical to successful reforms. A recent study by Wang et al. (2019) used a questionnaire
design and found that public acceptance of controversial energy programs is related to
the perceived risks and benefits.
In psychology and human resources research, studies have considered the effect
of social norms as forms of social control, and how contexts affect social perceptions
of crime. Bo¨ckenholt and van der Heijden (2007) found that adherence to insurance
regulations can be explained by personal and peer beliefs. While regulatory efforts
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could make a difference, personal and social network factors including peer approval
dominate the decision to comply. Cialdini (2007) discussed the role of social norms in
social control further. Injunctive social norms refer to what others view as appropriate
conduct, not what one views as the right conduct. Descriptive social norms refer to one’s
perception of what others actually do. In our paper, we use a conjoint experiment to try
to derive some of the injunctive and descriptive social norms by allowing respondents
to rank the acceptability of two hypothetical individuals committing power theft. We
add to the behavioral compliance literature by studying social perceptions underlying
non-compliant behavior in electricity markets in India. Schmidtke (2007) focused on
consensus and perceived similarity among restaurant workers’ theft behavior and found
that perceived similarity of actions and social norm are closely related to the peer
acceptability of theft behavior. That is, observers tend to be less likely to consider
a behavior as theft when they perceive themselves to be similar to the coworker in
question and if social norm consensus is low. This provides us with motivation to
consider whether group similarity through different social characteristics affect social
acceptability of theft.
3.3 Social Perceptions of Power Theft
Indian Context
The Indian caste system, originated in ancient India, continues to have cascading effects
in the Indian society. The lowest caste group, commonly known as Dalits2 (consisting of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), is considered to be historically disadvantaged
due to the suppressed opportunities, physical and social exclusion, underrepresentation,
2The term Dalit is considered unconstitutional by the National Commission of Scheduled Castes.
Modern legal usage would prefer Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST). To conform with colloquial
usage, the term Dalit is kept in the experimental design, though the authors hereby clearly acknowledge
the proper label of SC.
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and public humiliation - the Scheduled Castes were referred to as the “untouchables”
(Hasan, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Banerjee and Knight, 1985). Thorat and Newman
(2007) documented how the caste system persists as a system of inequality and discrim-
ination in India. A recent working paper by Aklin et al. (2018) found that electoral
success of the Dalit-supporting party has failed to reduce discrimination, and that sig-
nificant caste discrimination persists in policy implementation, which could also impact
energy access and policies to curb theft.
In addition to, and in conjunction to caste-based discrimination, a number of schol-
ars also find evidence of religious discrimination in all segments of the economy, in
particular towards religious minorities in India, where the practice of Hinduism rep-
resents the majority (Banerjee et al., 2005, 2009; Thorat and Attewell, 2007; Thorat,
2015). With this context in mind, it would be of import to consider if social acceptabil-
ity perceptions interplay with religion and caste, which have been important causes of
inequality and interact with poorer socioeconomic outcomes. If caste and religion do in
fact interact with social acceptability of theft, then they should be an area of attention
when aiming to design successful policy reforms to curb theft.
In a political client-broker settling, Auerbach and Thachil (2018) found that while
residents prefer co-ethnic leaders, their capacity to make claims on the state is of heavy
import. Both the broker’s caste status and religion being the same as the resident
increased the probability of being elected Slum President. Residents also disfavored
Muslim leaders and Scheduled Caste leaders. Thachil (2017) found that ethnic and class
divisions among rural-urban migrants persist, but these divisions can be muted under
the context triggering a common identity, such as when dealing with urban employers
and politicians. These contexts provide us with important motivation to include the
complexities of caste and religion in our study of public acceptance of electricity theft.
Using a large-scale conjoint experiment in Uttar Pradesh, India, we study social
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attitudes and perceptions toward power theft. In the conjoint experiment, respondents
are asked to compare two hypothetical individuals that commit power theft, albeit with
different sets of social characteristics. This allows us to test whether the socioeconomic
context effects affect perceptions of crime seriousness and acceptability akin to related
work by Aldrovandi et al. (2013) and Douhou et al. (2011). Our work differs from
the aforementioned studies in that we investigate the perceptions of power theft as an
incorrect behavior within the context of developing countries. Our results have direct
implications for designing new policies and strategies to curb power theft in developing
countries.
Context Effects: Income
Aldrovandi et al. (2013) and Douhou et al. (2011) provided evidence that the social
perceptions of small crimes can be influenced by social contexts. We first outline three
hypotheses related to the social contexts of possible theft perpetrators. First, in the
context of leniency for individuals with difficult income backgrounds, we expect that
the lower the income levels, the more acceptable it would be in general to commit
electricity theft. This means that the less well-off the hypothetical individual is, the
more likely one would find it acceptable for said individual to steal than for a more
well-off person; and conversely, the punishment chosen would be harsher on a richer
person taking advantage of others through theft.
Hypothesis 1 (Income and theft acceptability). The income level of an individual
using katiya is negatively related to social acceptability and positively related to the
desired punishment levels.
Thus, we expect that it would be more acceptable for a lower-income person to
commit theft, owing to the constraints on their spending.
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Context Effects: Poor Supply Quality
A similar reasoning on social contexts applies to supply quality: the more inadequate
the supply of electricity, the more likely one would accept theft behavior as a justifiable
action to rebel against the authorities as a form of social protest. In addition, when
a person already faces few hours of electricity supply, the associated social context is
that the economic circumstances are not ideal. In addition, since the quality is already
substandard, there is more reason to avoid standard legal payment for an incomplete
service. Therefore, we expect to see that where one receives less hours of electricity
(i.e. electricity supply quality is worse), the more acceptable a theft activity would
be for that person. When consumers steal electricity, overloads are possible and affect
voltage of the supply, and discoms face financial imbalances and are in more difficult
positions to improve on the infrastructure, perpetuating a theft-loss and trust vicious
cycle (Gaur and Gupta, 2016).
Hypothesis 2 (Supply quality and theft acceptability). The electricity quality level
of an individual using katiya is negatively related to social acceptability and positively
related to the desired punishment levels.
So the higher the quality of supply, the less acceptable one is for committing theft,
and the higher the desired punishment levels, and vice versa. In this setting, we ap-
proximate supply quality via duration of electricity supply.3 Blankenship et al. (2019)
detailed in a conjoint experiment setting as to how willingness to pay for improved
electricity access is related to supply quality in Uttar Pradesh.
3Supply quality also encompass other dimensions such as outages, voltage fluctuations, surge and
appliance damage, etc. To keep the experimental design as simple as possible, hours of supply was
chosen as a salient measurement of supply quality.
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Context Effects: Historic Discrimination and Social Similarity
We further make hypotheses on historic discrimination, social similarity, and accept-
ability of theft. As Cialdini (2007) and Schmidtke (2007) pointed to the effects of social
norms and perceived similarities on social control and theft acceptability, we posit that
social groups and classes also have a context effect on the social perceptions of theft.
On the one hand, one may expect that, in line with the previous socioeconomic-
based hypotheses that the less well-off member of the Scheduled Caste is likely to be
perceived as more acceptable in committing electricity theft. Historically, the Sched-
uled Caste has been regarded as the most oppressed social group, facing unparalleled
discrimination, limited opportunities, and have much poorer socioeconomic circum-
stances. This interaction between historic disadvantages, opportunity oppression, and
lower income could provide the context for higher social acceptance for theft committed
by the least well-off segment of society.
On the other hand, two mechanisms could lead to less acceptance for the Scheduled
Caste to commit electricity theft. The first argument is for stereotype aversion. Be-
cause of the historic discrimination faced and the social stereotyping that the group has
since been subjected to, and because of a social need to remove such classifications, the
sense of social sanction towards Scheduled Castes committing activities that continue
to perpetuate the stereotype could be heightened. This would mean that it is, albeit
not entirely intuitive, that it is less acceptable for someone in the Scheduled Caste to
commit theft because of the need to distance oneself from these historical categoriza-
tions. Second, it is also possible that there is persistent discrimination: any activity by
the Scheduled Caste could be considered as less acceptable regardless of the context,
if path-dependent, systemic discrimination persists. Aklin et al. (2018) showed that
significant bias in policy implementation exists and that caste discrimination continues
to persist in the policy implementation context. Auerbach and Thachil (2018) showed
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that residents do exhibit co-ethnic preferences in client-broker relationships in urban
India.
Given the uncertainty as to which of these effects dominate the perception of theft,
the following hypotheses are plausible:
Hypothesis 3a (Caste and Poorer Circumstances). Theft is more socially acceptable
with the Scheduled Caste (Dalit).
Hypothesis 3b (Persistant Discrimination or Stereotype Aversion). Theft is less so-
cially acceptable with the Scheduled Caste (Dalit).
In addition, preference for religion similarity could affect social perceptions of theft.
For a hypothetical person with a religion that is dissimilar to one’s own, we argue that,
due to preference for social similarities as noted in Schmidtke (2007), the hypothetical
person who commits theft will not be perceived as acceptable simply because they are
members of a different social group. Co-religious preference has also been detected in
other contexts (Auerbach and Thachil, 2018). However, it is also possible that the
opposite could hold true as one wishes to preserve the image of one own’s religion (akin
to the stereotype aversion above), and thus the results could be the opposite, where
one chooses to be more stringent to individuals sharing the same religion, and less so
for someone with another religion.
Hypothesis 4a (Religion Similarity and Image Preservation). Theft is less acceptable
for persons of the same religious background as one’s own.
Hypothesis 4b (Religion Dissimilarity). Theft is less acceptable for persons of different
religious background than one’s own.
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Known versus Diffuse Agents
Finally, we posit that petty crimes such as stealing from the store, family, and friends are
less acceptable socially than to steal from electricity utilities and government entities.
Because of standard social preferences for people more closely associated to oneself,
the cost of stealing from friends and family would include backlash from these known
individuals. This means that stealing from friends and family will incur higher personal
costs, so such behavior may be viewed as less acceptable than stealing from a larger,
distant entity. As for comparing stealing from strangers and stealing electricity, because
the party suffering from loss is more diffuse and distant with electricity (large utility
company with many operators and users), as opposed to a singular stranger (having
one individual bear the cost of stealing), it is plausible that theft from strangers is
viewed as less acceptable than stealing from the more diffuse entity.
Hypothesis 5 (Theft versus Other Crimes). Stealing from family, friends, and
strangers is less acceptable than stealing electricity.
3.4 Research Design
Experiment Administration and Sampling
To test the hypotheses outlined above, we conducted a conjoint survey with survey enu-
merators from Morsel India, an Uttar Pradesh-based survey company, who administered
a 45-minute survey to each respondent. The survey was conducted in late Spring of
2018. The survey is administered using an Android smart phone app, and is in Hindi.4
In addition to information related to the specific hypotheses we are testing, we also
collected data on respondents’ socioeconomic status, electricity usage, and preferences
4We wrote the surveys in English, but they were then translated into Hindi by Morsel.
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over government policy toward electricity access and pricing. We sampled 2 districts
each from 5 regions containing similar numbers of rural households in Uttar Pradesh.
This gives a total of 10 districts, within each 9 villages and 9 wards are chosen. From
this, a total of 900 village households and 900 urban households were sampled (10
households per village/ward). We collected data from a total of 1800 respondents, 900
from rural villages and 900 from urban wards. To ensure research transparency, a Pre-
Analysis Plan (PAP) was registered on Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP)’s
online repository in April 2018.5
Figure 1 depicts the five regions defined for sampling. Within each region group,
two districts were randomly sampled with the probability that a district is chosen being
the total number of households (villages and wards) in the district divided by the total
number of households (villages and wards) in the defined region. This results in 10
districts sampled, 2 from each region, with districts that have more households being
more likely to be chosen. Villages and wards were then similarly randomly chosen by
the household size weight, and finally, 10 households were chosen by systematic random
sampling on each village or ward site. This gives us 90 rural villages, 90 urban wards,
for a total of 1800 respondents representative of the state’s rural and urban populations.
Appendix A1 contains further details regarding the sampling strategy.
The conjoint survey consisted of an experimental section in which respondents were
given two hypothetical persons to compare. The respondents decides whether they
find Person A or Person B less acceptable given their circumstances and behavior. On
the activity dimension, the person may be using katiya (the majority of sample), or
stealing from friends, family, or strangers (for control). The key dimensions of interest
are income (randomized levels of income) and electricity (randomized levels of electricity
supply in their villages or wards). In addition, respondents may also know the caste and
5The PAP can be accessed here: http://egap.org/registration/4399. A pilot study was con-
ducted in January 2018.
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the religion of the hypothetical persons. They are asked to compare the hypothetical
persons and decide who is the less acceptable one, given their circumstances. They
are also asked to select a level of punishment for the person deemed less acceptable.
Respondents are asked to choose between two individuals of different characteristics.
The conjoint is repeated four times, i.e., respondents are asked to choose between two
individuals four times.6 In Figure 2, the conjoint section design is illustrated with
the randomly assigned personal circumstances and their probabilities. Enumerators
sketch the information of the two hypothetical persons on a chalkboard for comparison;
respondents are then asked to pick the less acceptable person along with a punishment
level.
Dependent Variables
Our first outcome variable is a latent variable of social acceptability of electricity theft,
which is recorded as an ordered outcome. In the conjoint experiment, each respon-
dent is randomly presented with four pairs of persons which vary on five dimensions.
Respondents are asked to make a tradeoff between social acceptability, socioeconomic
backgrounds, and electricity quality. The respondent chooses either Person A or Person
B to be less acceptable, or about equally unacceptable, given these hypothetical cir-
cumstances. This variable allows us to measure the conditions at which society would
find theft relatively more acceptable due to poor power quality and/or poverty.
Second, we ask respondents what appropriate severity of punishment they would
choose for the electricity theft. This allows us to further identify the perceived social
cost of electricity theft to society. To provide additional context, Section 135 of the
Electricity Act of India (as amended in 2007) outlines possible punishments for repeated
offenses to be punishable with a fine not less than six times the financial gain or with an
6The full sample size of the conjoint experiment is then 7200 responses.
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imprisonment term of up to five years.7 Like social acceptability, punishment severity
is also a latent variable recorded as an ordered outcome. Respondents choose from no
punishment, warning, monetary punishment, to jail time of up to three years. This
allows us to measure the deemed severity of punishment desired for the inappropriate
action from no punishment to very severe punishment. Desired punishment levels are
another indicator of social acceptability of crime.
Independent Variables
Context effects
The first part of our analysis is focused on the respondent-scenario level, where we
look at the context effects in the conjoint scenarios respondents receive. The model
specifications are as follows:
Acceptability∗i,j = β1∆Incomei,j + β2∆Qualityi,j + β3Dalit Castei,j
+β4Religion Similarityi,j + γXi + i,j
Punishment∗i,j = β1∆Incomei,j + β2∆Qualityi,j + β3Dalit Castei,j
+β4Religion Similarityi,j + γXi + i,j
where i indexes respondents and j indexes scenarios. In particular, the acceptabil-
ity and punishment conjoint scenarios appear four times for each respondent. In the
conjoint scenarios, respondents are given four pairs of persons to compare. Each sce-
nario presented has two person’s characteristics, including possibly differing covariate
dimensions. Respondents are asked to choose whether person A or B is less acceptable,
or about the same. Thus, the outcome is an ordered variable representing the latent
distribution of relative social acceptability of the activities of these persons presented.
7This depends on the severity of the violation; less than 10 kW is punished less severely with no
jail term. See Section 135 Part (e) subparts (i-ii) of the Electricity Act.
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We code acceptability as Acceptability of Person A, with Acceptability = 0 if A is less
acceptable, Acceptability = 0.5 if the respondent is unsure or indifferent, and Accept-
ability = 1 if respondents choose B to be less acceptable, implying acceptability of A.8
Respondents are also then asked for the appropriate punishment level, in increasing
severity levels from a small fine, a hefty fine, to jail time. This is also an ordinal out-
come variable representing the latent distribution of punishment severity desired for
the less acceptable hypothetical person.
Dalit Caste is a binary variable for the person chosen to be more acceptable is of the
Scheduled Caste (Dalit); Religion Similarity is a binary variable denoting whether the
more acceptable person has the same religion as the respondent. ∆Income would be the
difference in income between hypothetical person A and B. Income levels are presented
as four levels, at 3000, 6000, 9000, and 12000 Rupees9; these are randomly assigned
(along with no information) to the hypothetical person. ∆Quality is the difference in
hours of electricity supplied to the place where the hypothetical persons live. The hours
of electricity supply are randomly assigned from no information to 8, 12, 16, 20, 24 hours
of reliable electricity. Both income and electricity quality differences is computed by
the person B-person A. Xi is a vector of respondent-level control variables, and i is a
stochastic error term. Standard errors are clustered at the individual or village level,
as responses to the scenarios are likely to be highly correlated within individuals or
communities.
A summary of our outcome variables and primary independent variables can be
found in Table 3.1.
8This coding is represents a reversal as seen in the Pre-Analysis Plan. There are no qualitative
differences, but for coefficient interpretation a positive outcome is easier.
9These levels were chosen in consultation with CEEW and Morsel India for an appropriate range
of income for households in the sample.
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Controls
Additionally, we include a number of control variables. While these are not necessary
for the purpose of identification, we include them for the following reasons in order to
obtain more precise estimates of effects, in case they were significant. The first is a
dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was from a rural or an urban area,
in order to ensure that our effects are not driven primarily by respondents coming from
different types of areas.
Second, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives in
an electrified household connected to the grid. This is because our interpretation of
respondents’ perception of social acceptability may be different for electrified and non-
electrified households – in the case of the former, respondents have the reference of
their current access and cost, while in the case of the latter, respondents are viewing
theft from not consuming grid electricity at all.
Third, we control for the average number of hours of electricity supply a respondent
had access to each day. This variable takes a value of zero for non-electrified house-
holds. Next, we control for for logarithmized household expenditures. These allow us
to account for whether richer respondents have different ideas of social acceptability
of theft. Finally, we include a variety of dummy variables to account for household
socioeconomic status – namely, dummy variables for caste, religion, education-level,
and whether the respondent had a government ration card. Response to a question on




The survey instrument was conducted between May and July 2018 for 900 rural and
900 urban households. In Appendix A1, we provide further details on sampling, survey
design, and the particulars of survey deployment. We report our findings in this section.
In Figure 3.3, we summarize the results for social acceptability as an outcome at
the scenario level. Recall that we have coded the acceptability to be the acceptability
of hypothetical person A committing the small crime.10 The regressions in Figure 3.3
represents the full specification, whereby we regress acceptability of A on the income
and electricity supply differences of the offenders, the Dalit-status of person A, reli-
gion similarity of person A to the respondent, and all additional controls. Figure 3.3a
represents the OLS model, clustering standard errors by village or ward respectively.
Because the outcome variable is an ordinal outcome (accept, indifferent, and not ac-
cept), we present results from the ordered logit model as well in Figure 3.3b. The
number of observations is slightly discounted from the 7200 possible scenarios due to
missing observations for some of the control variables.11 The income variables repre-
sent the differences in income between hypothetical person B and A; the hours variables
represent the differences in supply hours between B and A. I.e., Income: -9 represents
the scenario in which A has 9000 more rupees of income than B; Hours: +4 represents
the scenario in which B has 4 more hours of electricity supply than A.
Both Figure 3.3a and 3.3b provide similar results. First of all, we see that income
differences between B and A strongly affect the social acceptability of A committing
the small crime. Since income difference is computed as B’s income minus A’s, positive
income differences means that B has more income than A. The positive and significant
coefficient indicates that the stronger this difference is, the more acceptable it is for
10Since respondents only choose between A and B to be less acceptable (unsure is permitted), by
coding acceptability of A we also in effect include the relative acceptability of person B.
114 scenarios per respondent; 1800 respondents in total yields 7200 at the scenario-level.
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A to commit theft. 12 We find a statistically significant effect of the income context
of the social acceptability of theft: the higher the income, the less acceptable it is to
commit theft.
Secondly, we find a similar result with the electricity supply quality. Here we also
see that differences in electricity hours supplied to the offenders A and B matter for
acceptability. Akin to income, the more hours (better quality) one receives than the
other person, the less acceptable it is to steal. The coefficients are somewhat smaller
than the income effect with larger confidence intervals. Religion similarity of A to
the respondent’s own religion is not a statistically significant determinant of social
acceptability; other controls did not have statistical significance either.
Table 3.2 presents the same two regressions as Figure 3.3, with the binned income
and hours differences between the hypothetical offenders replaced by a continuous vari-
able for the ease of interpretation. Column 1 represents the OLS regression and Column
2 the ordered logit regression. Indeed we see statistically significant effects of social con-
text. The OLS model would predict a 3.65% increase in acceptability for a 1000 rupee
difference between B and A (where B has more income than A). As we also saw in
Figure 3.3, there is a small but significant (at the 0.01 level) negative coefficient for
if the hypothetical person is of the Dalit/Scheduled Caste or not, suggesting that the
SC status actually decreases the social acceptability of theft by a small amount. This
lends slight support to either the explanation of stereotype aversion or persistent social
discrimination; we could not based on this data disentangle the two, but posit that
caste politics could play a role in designing theft-curbing policies.
In Figure 3.4, we summarize the results for desired levels of punishment as an out-
come at the scenario level. Recall that punishment levels are designated for the less
12Conversely, if A is the more well-off person, income differences are negative. The negative co-
efficients similarly indicate that the more well-off the person is, the less acceptable it is for them to
commit theft.
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acceptable person determined by the respondent, the independent variables of income
and hours are instead presented as absolute differences as the punishment levels refer
to whoever was the less acceptable already. For the caste and religion dimensions,
we include which hypothetical person was chosen as less acceptable (less acceptable ×
caste/religion status). We do not find statistically significant explanations for desired
punishment. Neither income differences nor supply differences strongly affect desired
punishment levels. In Table 3.3, we see that while income and supply differences do
not affect the desired punishment levels, the respondent’s own hours of supply and
Scheduled Caste/Dalit status had a small but significant effect. Desired punishment
levels are higher for households with more hours already, which could be explained by
a stronger norm of no theft as quality is already more adequate. Respondent’s own
caste status also influenced the desired punishment levels: if the respondent is of the
Scheduled Caste, then the punishment desired is less. Column 1 similarly reports OLS
results and Column 2 the ordered logit results. Including controls for the types of theft
(stealing from family, strangers, versus power theft) does not affect our results. Addi-
tional robustness tests are included in the Appendix and do not affect the qualitative
results.
To summarize, we find two main results. First, the income and hour hypotheses
outlined above seem to hold true. We find positive and significant coefficients for both
the difference in income and hours. This means that, the more income person B has over
person A (the poorer person A is), the more acceptable respondents find person A for
using katiya. For electricity hours, a similar result is shown. The more hours person B
receives over person A, the more acceptable it would be for person A to steal electricity
via katiya. The second result is somewhat surprising: these socioeconomic context
effects on acceptability do not translate into attitudes towards punishment. We also
find weakly negative results for the effect of caste; if person A is of the Dalit caste, it is
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less likely for respondents to find the use of katiya acceptable. A potential explanation
could be, as outlined above, that respondents have an impetus for stereotype aversion
for the Dalit caste not to commit theft, or that the responses are indicative of an
environment of persistent social discrimination.
3.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Our results show that socioeconomic contexts of people affect how others view whether
or not power theft is an acceptable action. In particular, the economic circumstances
and the electricity supply quality strongly affect the perception of social acceptability
of committing electricity theft. The OLS model would predict a 3.65% increase in
acceptability for a 1000 rupee difference between B and A (where B has more income
than A). The more well-off an individual is, with better supply quality, is deemed less
acceptable to be committing theft, and vice versa. We find evidence supporting context-
dependent social approval for stealing electricity. Religious and caste and associated
in-group preferences seem to be of secondary order, though the complexities of caste
discrimination remain a potential area for further research in the political economy of
small crimes in the development and energy policy context.
We also find that these very set of economic and electricity contexts do not influence
socially desired punishment the same way. Punishment desired for power theft is low to
begin with (with a mean at warning or small fine). Economic and electricity contexts do
not help explain the variance in punishment levels desired for power theft. This could
be explained in two ways. First, it could suggest that the prevailing sense of justice
(different from social acceptability) is tied strongly to the crime itself, the stealing,
and so punishment levied would be mostly about the crime, and not the context. This
could lead to results where economic circumstances and electricity supply quality do
not matter. Second, and we believe this is more likely the case, that while there exists
122
a sense of social reprimand for stealing power, actual desired enforcement of regulations
is simply low. Power theft is seen as a bad thing to do, but not so bad that it warrants
strong punishments - either it has become a status quo in society, or it just simply isn’t
a priority in the individual’s justice compass, compared to other priorities.
Overall, our results indicate that indeed theft acceptability is linked to the offender
circumstances, in particular, the income levels and the hours of electricity supply they
receive. The richer the perpetrator, and the more hours of electricity supply they
receive, the less likely it would be for citizens to view them as acceptable behavior. We
do not find that similarities between the respondent and the perpetrator in caste and
in religion affect the perceptions of acceptability, so in-group preferences or biases such
as seen in Tajfel (1974) are not important determinants of social acceptability of power
theft.
In the latest effort to secure universal power access, the Saubhagya scheme was
launched to accelerate power connections through intensive connection campaigns that
were supposed to conclude in 2018. The Saubhagya scheme introduced free or low-cost
connections along with harsher punishments including lengthy jail times. In 2017, Ut-
tar Pradesh State Power Minister announced up to five-year jail time for first-time theft
offenders and seven years for second time offenders. In a recent (June 2018) news article
from First Post, it was reported that Uttar Pradesh has been doubling theft detection
squads and violating property rights and privacy by using ladders to enter balconies.
These aggressive, top-down approaches to curb theft are unlikely to secure strong so-
cial buy-in because our results show that while social reprimand can be significant,
desired punishment levels are far below these kinds of measures being implemented
or considered. Successful reduction in power theft will require a different approach,
one that considers the social attitudes and prevailing norms in the communities; a
one-size-fits-all, harsh punishment model is unlikely to work.
123
Given our results on social acceptability and punishment, we recommend switching
from a model of harsh punishment to a participatory, holistic approach to curb power
theft. Community-based participatory rule setting and a close cooperation model with
local power officials could create longer lasting impacts; utility officials should pay
close attention to the social and economic contexts of theft offenders. For such a model
to succeed, trust-building between the consumption agents, village leadership, utility
managers, officials, and linemen have to be strengthened. A scheme to help convert
and retrain katiyamen - the laborers who dangerously attach live wires onto existing
systems - to work at the utility or in another relevant industry could also be considered.
In order for theft deterrents to work and be sustained, simply raising punishment levels
would not achieve the goal if there is a sense of social acceptability of theft - whether it
is in retaliation to poor service quality thus perpetuating the theft-loss cycle or due to
prevalence (Gaur and Gupta, 2016; Douhou et al., 2011). A sustaining policy outcome
requires social norm adjustment, from a theft seems acceptable one to a no-theft one,
which in our view would not happen without the consideration of the income and supply
quality dynamics, as well as the complexities of caste and social discrimination.
This paper provided evidence that social contexts do affect social acceptability of
power theft using a large-scale conjoint experiment. The fact that socially desired
punishment for theft is low and not affected as much by social contexts suggests that
a harsh punishment model is unlikely to have strong social buy-in. Instead, it may
increase risks and rents for offenders and generate more rent for katiyamen and corrupt
officials who benefit financially from the scheme. Future research should focus on the
system of corruption in the power sector and on understanding the structure of the
informal katiyamen labor market.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Defined Sampling Regions for Uttar Pradesh
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Section 6 Attitudes on Crime  
You will now be asked to compare two situations between two hypothetical people a few times. 
For each set of people, please tell me what you think about them. 
Which do you find less acceptable, behavior of Person A or B? You can say about equal as well. 
Person A  Person B  
Caste background dimension Caste background dimension 
BLANK (50%)  
Dalit (50%)  
BLANK (50%)  
Dalit (50%)  
Religion background dimension Religion background dimension 
BLANK (50%)  
Hindu (25%)  
Muslim (25%)  
BLANK (50%)  
Hindu (25%)  
Muslim (25%) 
Activity dimension  Activity dimension  
Steals from friends/family (6.66%) 
Steals from strangers (13.33%) 
Has katiya at home (80%) 
Steals from friends/family (6.66%) 
Steals from strangers (13.33%) 
Has katiya at home (80%) 
Income dimension (all activities) Income dimension (all activities) 
BLANK or 
When household income is  
[3000, 6000, 9000, 12000] 
BLANK or 
When household income is  
[3000, 6000, 9000, 12000] 
Electricity dimension 
*ONLY IF Activity Dim. Includes Katiya 
Electricity dimension 
*ONLY IF Activity Dim. Includes Katiya 
BLANK  
or 
When the village/ward has less than  
[8, 12, 16, 20, 24] hours of reliable electricity 
BLANK   
or 
When the village/ward has less than  
[8, 12, 16, 20, 24] hours of reliable electricity 
 
Percentages indicate the probability of that value appearing within that dimension in a scenario. 
If not noted, the probability is equal among all possible values. 









































































































































































































(b) Ordered Logit Model, Full Controls - Outcome: Acceptability
(n=6576)
Figure 3.3: Effects of scenario frames on respondent’s acceptance of theft (conjoint-
level)
Standard errors clustered at the village/ward level. Mean acceptability = 0.543
(0.333). Panel (a) reports the OLS regression of acceptability on income and electricity
quality differences, as well as religion similarity and caste status of the perpetrator.
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Panel (b) reports the same specification except with an Ordered Logit Model instead.
Income and electricity quality differences affect the social acceptability of a person
committing the theft. The worse off one is in income and in quality of electricity, the























































































































































































































































































(b) Ordered Logit Model, Full Controls - Outcome: Punishment
Figure 3.4: Effects of scenario frames on respondent’s desired punishment levels for
theft (conjoint-level)
Standard errors clustered at the village/ward level. Mean punishment levels = 2.387
(0.574); scale ranges from 1-4. Panel (a) reports the OLS regression of punishment
levels on income and electricity quality differences, as well as religion similarity and
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controls on the respodent’s caste and religion background. Panel (b) reports the same
specification except with an Ordered Logit Model instead. Neither income differences













































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Acceptability of hypothetical person A committing theft
(1) (2)
∆ Income (B-A) 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.0121)
∆ Hours 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.00145) (0.00746)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.0465∗∗ −0.223∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0792)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0315 0.159+
(0.0198) (0.0952)
Education of Resp. −0.00151 −0.00768
(0.00232) (0.0110)






Ration card −0.0110 −0.0564
(0.0193) (0.0920)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.000677 −0.00349
(0.00209) (0.0101)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.0179 0.0852
(0.0218) (0.104)









Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the village/ward level
Column 1: OLS regression; Column 2: Ordered logit regression
Reports regression results with acceptability of person A as the dependent variable.
Income and hours difference computed as compared to person B, where positive
difference means B has more than A.
Rel Sim is Religion Similarity of A to the respondent.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.3: Punishment for the less acceptable
(1) (2)
Abs. Income diff 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.010)
Abs. Hours diff −0.003 −0.008
(0.002) (0.008)
A chosen=1 −0.043 −0.177
(0.038) (0.130)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.027 −0.104
(0.027) (0.092)
A chosen=1 × Dalit Caste of A=1 0.014 0.063
(0.042) (0.142)
Rel. Sim of A=1 −0.016 −0.098
(0.029) (0.101)
A chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of A=1 0.070 0.270+
(0.046) (0.160)
Rel. Sim of B=1 −0.006 0.007
(0.044) (0.160)
B chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of B=1 0.013 0.024
(0.053) (0.198)
Education of Resp. 0.004 0.012
(0.003) (0.011)






Ration card 0.023 0.082
(0.033) (0.114)
Hours supplied of Resp. 0.010∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.004) (0.013)
Resp. Dalit caste −0.086∗ −0.309∗
(0.034) (0.122)









Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the village/ward level
Column 1: OLS regression; Column 2: Ordered logit regression
Reports regression results with punishment levels as the dependent variable.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
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B.1 Survey Design and Sampling
The following subsections outline in detail the design and structure of the survey and
conjoint experiment as well as the sampling strategy employed. We note the publishing
of a pre-analysis plan at the end of this section.
The survey consists of 8 short sections, designed to be conducted orally and for
the data to be entered in a cell-phone programmed application with GPS capabilities.
Enumerators were trained in supervised sessions on how to conduct the survey. Verbal
and on-site procedures were repeated and tested. The survey lasts approximately 30-45
minutes.
We first survey the respondents’ background and socioeconomic information to es-
tablish baseline characteristics of a household. Section 3 asks respondents for the
electricity and lighting situation in the household, including types of electricity, costs,
billing, and supply quality. We then survey the respondents for the assets owned in
Section 4.
Section 5 contain carefully worded questions on trust, aimed to gauge the respon-
dents’ level of trust in general as well as towards institutions. We further ask respon-
dents about the importance of different dimensions of electricity, including quality, bill
collection, employee communication, and financial management.
Section 6 contains the main conjoint experiment of the survey. In this section, the
enumerator first introduces the section by stating that the following questions will con-
sist of hypothetical situations. Respondents are asked to think about how they would
react or feel according to those scenarios. Enumerators use a small blackboard and
chalk to help illustrate clearly to the respondents the hypothetical scenarios presented.
Respondents are told that they will be presented with two hypothetical persons to
compare. For these persons, respondents receive up to five dimensions of information:
1. Caste background: Whether the hypothetical person is of the Dalit caste.
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2. Religion background: The religion background of the hypothetical person.
3. Activity: Whether the hypothetical person is committing power theft with katiya,
stealing from strangers, or stealing from friends/family.
4. Household income: The level of household income, ranging from 3000 to 12000
rupees.
5. Electricity Supply: The hours of electricity available to the village/ward, ranging
from 8 to 24 hours.
The enumerator writes down these dimensions (randomized across a number of values,
where blank is an option so that enumerator says nothing) on the blackboard and
present them to the respondent. The respondent then answer with less acceptable
choice of person between person A and B, or equally unacceptable/don’t know, and the
desired level of punishment for the less acceptable. Each respondent faces four different
conjoint scenarios, i.e. four pairs of persons to compare.
After the main conjoint experiment, Section 7 contains a separate, three-scenario
conjoint experiment on billing preferences, the details of which are omitted here. The
survey concludes in Section 8 by asking the respondents’ perception of the extent of
illegal electricity and their general views on acceptability of katiya; the enumerator
also anonymously records whether an illegal connection in the interviewed household is
observed. Respondents are also asked for a reservation value for them to switch between
legal and illegal connections; a bidding game is used to improve the stated reservation
value.
The survey was piloted in January 2018 and underwent revisions thereafter. Further
supervised field training and testing in non-sample districts in both rural and urban
populations were conducted in March 2018 before the final survey was conducted. The
survey data was made available in late July-August 2018.
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Sampling
Our sampling strategy is as follows. We first organized districts in Uttar Pradesh into
5 regions:
• Upper and Middle Doab
• Rohilkhand
• Lower Doab and Bundelkhand
• Awadh
• Purvanchal
The regions were arranged such that the total number of rural households, as per
the 2011 Census of India, of each group is approximately identical and contiguous
(see Figure 1). Additions and subtractions of districts into the geographically defined
regions were done to keep household totals as equal in each region as possible. Within
each region group, two districts were randomly sampled with the probability that a
district is chosen being the total number of households (villages and wards) in the
district divided by the total number of households (villages and wards) in the defined
region. This results in 10 districts sampled, 2 from each region, with districts that have
more households being more likely to be chosen.
In each of the 10 resultant districts, we first sample for rural villages. Villages were
ranked by total number of households and sorted two groups: “small” and “large” vil-
lages by size. The determination of size were done by ranking village household totals
and partitioning them until the small group contained roughly the 45% of households,
and the large 55%. This means that the “large” group should contain fewer, larger
villages and the “small” group should have numerous but smaller villages. Finally,
within the “small” group we sample 4 villages and within the “large” group we sample
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5 villages, with the probability that a village is chosen should be the village households
divided by total “small” or “large” group households. In each chosen village, 10 house-
holds are surveyed with systematic random sampling. This yields 90 villages with 900
respondents in the rural areas.
In the urban areas, our sample is at the ward level, rather than at the village level.
We use the 10 chosen districts and repeat the same procedure as the above. Urban
wards were ranked by total number of households and sorted two groups: “small” and
“large” wards by size. The determination of size were done by ranking ward household
numbers and partitioning them until the small group contained roughly the 45% of
households, and the large 55%. This means that the “large” group should contain
fewer, larger wards and the “small” group should have numerous but smaller wards.
Finally, within the “small” group we sample 4 wards and within the “large” group
we sample 5 wards, with the probability that a ward is chosen should be the ward
households divided by total “small” or “large” group households. In each chosen ward,
10 households are surveyed with systematic random sampling. This yields 90 wards
with 900 respondents in the urban areas.
In order to collect our data, we have experienced survey enumerators from Morsel
India, an Uttar Pradesh-based survey company, administer a 45-minute survey to each
respondent. The survey is administered using an Android smart phone app, and is in
Hindi.1 In addition to information related to the specific hypotheses we are testing, we
are also collecting a variety of data on respondents’ socioeconomic status, electricity
usage, and preferences over government policy toward electricity access and pricing.
1We wrote the surveys in English, but they were then translated into Hindi by Morsel.
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Pre-Analysis Plan, Power Analysis, IRB
A pre-analysis plan with a power analysis was registered on the Evidence in Governance
and Politics (EGAP) registry on April 2nd, 2018. The registration ID is 20180402AA
and the pre-analysis plan with power analysis can be accessed here: http://egap.org/
registration/4399. The initial pilot was conducted in Jan 2018. The IRB is filed at
Johns Hopkins SAIS under the record HIRB00006510 - exempt.
Data Availability
All data used in the analysis will be made publicly available upon publication of the
article without any restrictions on Harvard Dataverse.
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B.2 Supplementary Tables
• Unless otherwise noted, all SEs are clustered at the village/ward level.
• Table B.1 reports the summary statistics for key social and demographic variables
for the respondents.
• Table B.2 provides the summary statistics for the hypothetical person A in the
survey experiment. They do indeed correspond to the randomization design.
• Table B.3 provides the summary statistics for the hypothetical person B in the
survey experiment. They do indeed correspond to the randomization design.
• Table B.4 summarizes the acceptability and punishment levels on average.
• Table B.5 presents the correlation matrix at the respondent level of selected de-
mographic variables and the outcome variables.
• Table B.6 provides the results of OLS and ordered logit regressions of accept-
ability of hypothetical person A. The last column includes dummy variables of
the scenarios (where 13.33% saw stealing from strangers and 6.66% stealing from
friends/family instead of katiya use). The different combinations did not produce
a statistically significant impact on acceptability.2
• Table B.7 provides the results of OLS and ordered logit regressions of desired pun-
ishment levels of the less acceptable. The last column includes dummy variables
of the scenarios (where 13.33% saw stealing from strangers and 6.66% stealing
from friends/family instead of katiya use).
2Stealing from friends and family omitted as control; the original intendned randomization was
15% to 5% respectively (in the designed survey), but due to an error at software development, the
above percentages were used instead.
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• Table B.8 provides the main results from the OLS figure in the main paper (Fig.
3a) in table form. The standard errors are robust in column 1, and clustered by
respondent and village respectively in columns 2 and 3.
• Table B.9 provides the main results from the ordered logit figure in the main
paper (Fig. 3b) in table form. The standard errors are robust in column 1, and
clustered by respondent and village respectively in columns 2 and 3.
• Table B.10 - same as Table B.9, in odds-ratio for ease of interpretation.
• Table B.11 - same model as Tables B.8 and B.9 above, except logistic regression
is run instead for robustness.
• Table B.12 provides the main results from the OLS figure on punishment in the
main paper (Fig. 4a) in table form. The standard errors are robust in column 1,
and clustered by respondent and village respectively in columns 2 and 3.
• Table B.13 provides an at-a-glance one-table version including both acceptabil-
ity and punishment. Columns 2 and 4 exclude all zeros and blanks in dimen-
sions (keeping only scenarios with full information). Results magnitude are even
stronger for acceptability. No qualitative difference overall.
• Table B.14 reports an alternative-specific mixed logit model. Unlike the above
models, where we make use of calculated differences in income and electricity
supply levels, this model allows us to use the characteristics of Persons A and
B directly as “alternative-specific” characteristics of the two alternative persons.
Respondents then choose one of them, coded here as the more acceptable (not
chosen to be less acceptable). In the first column, we assume that preferences
over income and acceptability are the same population-wide, but preferences over
electricity supply quality vary (normally). In the second column, we assume
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that preferences over income and electricity supply quality and acceptability are
the same population-wide, but preferences over caste vary among individuals.
Both models confirm the results above, whereby higher income levels and higher

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Summary Statistics - Scenario Person A
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A Caste - Blank 7200 .51 .5 0 1
A Caste - Dalit 7200 .49 .5 0 1
A Religion - Blank 7200 .502 .5 0 1
A Hindu 7200 .251 .434 0 1
A Muslim 7200 .247 .431 0 1
A Income - Blank 7200 .197 .398 0 1
A Income = 3000 7200 .208 .406 0 1
A Income = 6000 7200 .201 .401 0 1
A Income = 9000 7200 .199 .4 0 1
A Income = 12000 7200 .195 .396 0 1
A Hours - Blank 7200 .336 .473 0 1
A 8 Hours 7200 .132 .338 0 1
A 12 Hours 7200 .132 .338 0 1
A 16 Hours 7200 .141 .348 0 1
A 20 Hours 7200 .13 .336 0 1
A 24 Hours 7200 .129 .336 0 1
A Katiya User 7200 .797 .403 0 1
A Family 7200 .069 .253 0 1
A Strangers 7200 .135 .341 0 1
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics - Scenario Person B
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
B Caste - Blank 7200 .495 .5 0 1
B Caste - Dalit 7200 .505 .5 0 1
B Religion - Blank 7200 .492 .5 0 1
B Hindu 7200 .252 .434 0 1
B Muslim 7200 .257 .437 0 1
B Income - Blank 7200 .199 .399 0 1
B Income = 3000 7200 .196 .397 0 1
B Income = 6000 7200 .196 .397 0 1
B Income = 9000 7200 .204 .403 0 1
B Income = 12000 7200 .205 .404 0 1
B Hours - Blank 7200 .328 .469 0 1
B 8 Hours 7200 .134 .341 0 1
B 12 Hours 7200 .138 .345 0 1
B 16 Hours 7200 .131 .338 0 1
B 20 Hours 7200 .135 .342 0 1
B 24 Hours 7200 .134 .341 0 1
B Katiya User 7200 .8 .4 0 1
B Family 7200 .067 .25 0 1
B Strangers 7200 .133 .339 0 1
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics - Scenario Level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A Acceptable 7200 .543 .333 0 1
B Acceptable 7200 .457 .333 0 1
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.6: Acceptability of Hypothetical Person A
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Income (B-A) 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.0121) (0.0121)
∆ Hours 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(0.00145) (0.00746) (0.00740)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.0465∗∗ −0.223∗∗ −0.216∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0792) (0.0794)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0315 0.159+ 0.166+
(0.0198) (0.0952) (0.0956)
Education of Resp. −0.00151 −0.00768 −0.00800
(0.00232) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Log Spending of Resp. −0.000848 −0.00132 0.00428
(0.0153) (0.0725) (0.0723)
Urban −0.00202 −0.00228 −0.00363
(0.0189) (0.0892) (0.0894)
Electrified −0.0626 −0.342 −0.339
(0.0654) (0.352) (0.354)
Ration card −0.0110 −0.0564 −0.0556
(0.0193) (0.0920) (0.0923)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.000677 −0.00349 −0.00328
(0.00209) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.0179 0.0852 0.0891
(0.0218) (0.104) (0.103)
Resp. Hindu 0.0145 0.0782 0.0677
(0.0266) (0.126) (0.127)








A Strangers=1 × B Strangers=1 −0.996
(1.618)
A Katiya User=1 × B Strangers=1 −0.866
(1.450)
B Katiya User=1 0.0445
(1.404)
A Strangers=1 × B Katiya User=1 −1.131
(1.523)




N 2984 2984 2984
R2 0.131
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.108
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: OLS regression
Column 2: ordered logit regression
Column 3: Katiya vs Stealing
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.7: Punishment for the less acceptable
(1) (2) (3)
Abs. Income diff 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
Abs. Hours diff −0.003 −0.008 −0.001
(0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
A chosen=1 −0.043 −0.177 0.219
(0.038) (0.130) (0.406)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.027 −0.104 −0.109
(0.027) (0.092) (0.092)
A chosen=1 × Dalit Caste of A=1 0.014 0.063 0.075
(0.042) (0.142) (0.144)
Rel. Sim of A=1 −0.016 −0.098 −0.095
(0.029) (0.101) (0.102)
A chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of A=1 0.070 0.270+ 0.269+
(0.046) (0.160) (0.163)
Rel. Sim of B=1 −0.006 0.007 0.003
(0.044) (0.160) (0.162)
B chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of B=1 0.013 0.024 0.030
(0.053) (0.198) (0.200)
Education of Resp. 0.004 0.012 0.013
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Log Spending of Resp. 0.006 0.008 0.005
(0.020) (0.069) (0.070)
Urban 0.009 0.045 0.052
(0.041) (0.145) (0.145)
Electrified −0.031 −0.177 −0.162
(0.097) (0.343) (0.351)
Ration card 0.023 0.082 0.081
(0.033) (0.114) (0.115)
Hours supplied of Resp. 0.010∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.004) (0.013) (0.013)
Resp. Dalit caste −0.086∗ −0.309∗ −0.314∗
(0.034) (0.122) (0.123)
Resp. Hindu 0.073 0.231 0.240
(0.050) (0.179) (0.178)
Trust 0.029+ 0.117∗ 0.117∗
(0.016) (0.056) (0.056)
A Katiya User=1 −0.048
(0.178)





A chosen=1 × A Strangers=1 0.256
(0.421)
B Katiya User=1 −0.189
(0.227)








N 2984 2984 2984
R2 0.021
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: OLS regression
Column 2: ordered logit regression
Column 3: Katiya vs Stealing
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.8: OLS Model of Acceptability of A
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Income = -9 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0192)
∆ Income = -6 −0.107∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0152)
∆ Income = -3 −0.0670∗∗∗ −0.0670∗∗∗ −0.0670∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0133)
∆ Income = 3 0.0700∗∗∗ 0.0700∗∗∗ 0.0700∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0119)
∆ Income = 6 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0148)
∆ Income = 9 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0191)
∆ Hours = -16 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0315) (0.0271)
∆ Income = -12 −0.0491∗ −0.0491∗ −0.0491∗
(0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0189)
∆ Income = -8 −0.0975∗∗∗ −0.0975∗∗∗ −0.0975∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0158) (0.0156)
∆ Income = -4 −0.0417∗∗ −0.0417∗∗ −0.0417∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0130)
∆ Income = 4 0.0115 0.0115 0.0115
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0147)
∆ Income = 8 0.0325∗ 0.0325∗ 0.0325∗
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0160)
∆ Income = 12 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0187)
∆ Income = 18 0.0974∗∗∗ 0.0974∗∗∗ 0.0974∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0300)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.0239∗∗ −0.0239∗∗ −0.0239∗∗
(0.00799) (0.00806) (0.00798)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
(0.00914) (0.00912) (0.00944)
Education of Resp. −0.000820 −0.000820 −0.000820
(0.000993) (0.00107) (0.00109)
Log Spending of Resp. 0.00587 0.00587 0.00587
(0.00676) (0.00724) (0.00804)
Urban −0.00322 −0.00322 −0.00322
(0.00898) (0.00967) (0.00938)
Electrified −0.0171 −0.0171 −0.0171
(0.0275) (0.0320) (0.0328)
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Ration card −0.00217 −0.00217 −0.00217
(0.00829) (0.00902) (0.00886)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.000740 −0.000740 −0.000740
(0.00100) (0.00108) (0.00102)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.0162 0.0162 0.0162
(0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0121)
Resp. Hindu 0.00939 0.00939 0.00939
(0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0120)
Trust 0.0000838 0.0000838 0.0000838
(0.00342) (0.00379) (0.00353)
Constant 0.527∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.0662) (0.0728) (0.0834)
N 6576 6576 6576
R2 0.068 0.068 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: Robust SE
Column 2: Cluster SE by Respondent
Column 3: Cluster SE by Resp, Village
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.9: Ordered Logit Model of Acceptability of A
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Income = -9 −0.830∗∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.123) (0.118)
∆ Income = -6 −0.643∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗
(0.0871) (0.0895) (0.0870)
∆ Income = -3 −0.401∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗
(0.0713) (0.0726) (0.0784)
∆ Income = 3 0.399∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.0695) (0.0724) (0.0709)
∆ Income = 6 0.646∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.0846) (0.0861) (0.0915)
∆ Income = 9 0.886∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.112) (0.117)
∆ Hours = -16 −0.705∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.190) (0.165)
∆ Income = -12 −0.292∗ −0.292∗ −0.292∗
(0.127) (0.134) (0.115)
∆ Income = -8 −0.592∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗
(0.0983) (0.0960) (0.0935)
∆ Income = -4 −0.255∗∗ −0.255∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.0850) (0.0840) (0.0759)
∆ Income = 4 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579
(0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0862)
∆ Income = 8 0.189∗ 0.189∗ 0.189∗
(0.0949) (0.0945) (0.0956)
∆ Income = 12 0.455∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.121) (0.113)
∆ Income = 18 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗
(0.174) (0.171) (0.188)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.144∗∗ −0.144∗∗ −0.144∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0486) (0.0482)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573
(0.0547) (0.0545) (0.0563)
Education of Resp. −0.00491 −0.00491 −0.00491
(0.00596) (0.00640) (0.00665)
Log Spending of Resp. 0.0453 0.0453 0.0453
(0.0419) (0.0447) (0.0498)
Urban −0.0264 −0.0264 −0.0264
(0.0543) (0.0585) (0.0574)
Electrified −0.0815 −0.0815 −0.0815
(0.162) (0.190) (0.200)
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Ration card −0.0102 −0.0102 −0.0102
(0.0496) (0.0537) (0.0532)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.00519 −0.00519 −0.00519
(0.00607) (0.00654) (0.00622)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.107 0.107 0.107
(0.0706) (0.0732) (0.0771)
Resp. Hindu 0.0564 0.0564 0.0564
(0.0641) (0.0685) (0.0716)
Trust 0.00156 0.00156 0.00156
(0.0203) (0.0226) (0.0209)
N 6576 6576 6576
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: Robust SE
Column 2: Cluster SE by Respondent
Column 3: Cluster SE by Resp, Village
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.10: Ordered Logit - Odds Ratio Table
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Income = -9 −0.830∗∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.123) (0.118)
∆ Income = -6 −0.643∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗
(0.0871) (0.0895) (0.0870)
∆ Income = -3 −0.401∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗
(0.0713) (0.0726) (0.0784)
∆ Income = 3 0.399∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.0695) (0.0724) (0.0709)
∆ Income = 6 0.646∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.0846) (0.0861) (0.0915)
∆ Income = 9 0.886∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.112) (0.117)
∆ Hours = -16 −0.705∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗∗ −0.705∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.190) (0.165)
∆ Income = -12 −0.292∗ −0.292∗ −0.292∗
(0.127) (0.134) (0.115)
∆ Income = -8 −0.592∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗
(0.0983) (0.0960) (0.0935)
∆ Income = -4 −0.255∗∗ −0.255∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.0850) (0.0840) (0.0759)
∆ Income = 4 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579
(0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0862)
∆ Income = 8 0.189∗ 0.189∗ 0.189∗
(0.0949) (0.0945) (0.0956)
∆ Income = 12 0.455∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.121) (0.113)
∆ Income = 18 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗
(0.174) (0.171) (0.188)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.144∗∗ −0.144∗∗ −0.144∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0486) (0.0482)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0573 0.0573 0.0573
(0.0547) (0.0545) (0.0563)
Education of Resp. −0.00491 −0.00491 −0.00491
(0.00596) (0.00640) (0.00665)
Log Spending of Resp. 0.0453 0.0453 0.0453
(0.0419) (0.0447) (0.0498)
Urban −0.0264 −0.0264 −0.0264
(0.0543) (0.0585) (0.0574)
Electrified −0.0815 −0.0815 −0.0815
(0.162) (0.190) (0.200)
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Ration card −0.0102 −0.0102 −0.0102
(0.0496) (0.0537) (0.0532)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.00519 −0.00519 −0.00519
(0.00607) (0.00654) (0.00622)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.107 0.107 0.107
(0.0706) (0.0732) (0.0771)
Resp. Hindu 0.0564 0.0564 0.0564
(0.0641) (0.0685) (0.0716)
Trust 0.00156 0.00156 0.00156
(0.0203) (0.0226) (0.0209)
N 6576 6576 6576
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: Robust SE
Column 2: Cluster SE by Respondent
Column 3: Cluster SE by Resp, Village
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.11: Logisitc Model of Acceptability of A
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Income = -9 −1.247∗∗∗ −1.247∗∗∗ −1.247∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.198) (0.186)
∆ Income = -6 −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.150) (0.146)
∆ Income = -3 −0.625∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.123) (0.132)
∆ Income = 3 0.815∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.136) (0.139)
∆ Income = 6 1.080∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.155) (0.154)
∆ Income = 9 1.561∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.234) (0.245)
∆ Hours = -16 −1.226∗∗∗ −1.226∗∗∗ −1.226∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.342) (0.292)
∆ Income = -12 −0.471∗ −0.471∗ −0.471∗∗
(0.202) (0.213) (0.177)
∆ Income = -8 −0.867∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.150) (0.148)
∆ Income = -4 −0.358∗ −0.358∗ −0.358∗
(0.154) (0.153) (0.142)
∆ Income = 4 0.228 0.228 0.228
(0.168) (0.167) (0.169)
∆ Income = 8 0.339∗ 0.339∗ 0.339∗
(0.166) (0.165) (0.159)
∆ Income = 12 0.764∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.232) (0.209)
∆ Income = 18 0.779∗ 0.779∗ 0.779∗
(0.311) (0.307) (0.318)
Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.225∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.225∗∗
(0.0807) (0.0810) (0.0798)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.158+ 0.158+ 0.158
(0.0956) (0.0957) (0.0979)
Education of Resp. −0.00693 −0.00693 −0.00693
(0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Log Spending of Resp. −0.00230 −0.00230 −0.00230
(0.0631) (0.0677) (0.0734)
Urban 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130
(0.0886) (0.0961) (0.0899)
Electrified −0.327 −0.327 −0.327
(0.321) (0.364) (0.358)
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Ration card −0.0473 −0.0473 −0.0473
(0.0876) (0.0972) (0.0922)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.00448 −0.00448 −0.00448
(0.00995) (0.0107) (0.0101)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.0802 0.0802 0.0802
(0.102) (0.105) (0.103)
Resp. Hindu 0.0878 0.0878 0.0878
(0.111) (0.119) (0.126)
Trust −0.0113 −0.0113 −0.0113
(0.0368) (0.0406) (0.0381)
Constant 0.882 0.882 0.882
(0.664) (0.734) (0.806)
N 2984 2984 2984
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.109 0.109
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: Robust SE
Column 2: Cluster SE by Respondent
Column 3: Cluster SE by Resp, Village
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.12: OLS Model of Punishment Levels
(1) (2) (3)
Abs. Income diff = 3 0.0520∗∗ 0.0520∗∗ 0.0520∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0179)
Abs. Income diff = 6 0.0265 0.0265 0.0265
(0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0183)
Abs. Income diff = 9 0.0547∗ 0.0547∗ 0.0547∗
(0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0258)
Abs. Hours diff = 4 −0.00856 −0.00856 −0.00856
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0172)
Abs. Hours diff = 8 −0.00297 −0.00297 −0.00297
(0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0209)
Abs. Hours diff = 12 −0.0586∗ −0.0586∗ −0.0586∗
(0.0262) (0.0267) (0.0249)
Abs. Hours diff = 16 −0.000640 −0.000640 −0.000640
(0.0386) (0.0388) (0.0389)
A chosen=1 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297
(0.0305) (0.0330) (0.0350)
Dalit Caste of A=1 0.0135 0.0135 0.0135
(0.0190) (0.0183) (0.0187)
A chosen=1 × Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.0276 −0.0276 −0.0276
(0.0387) (0.0398) (0.0383)
B chosen=1 0.0696∗ 0.0696∗ 0.0696∗
(0.0273) (0.0296) (0.0311)
B chosen=1 × b dalit=1 −0.0412 −0.0412 −0.0412
(0.0340) (0.0350) (0.0352)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0264 0.0264 0.0264
(0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0187)
A chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of A=1 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241
(0.0388) (0.0399) (0.0415)
Rel. Sim of B=1 0.0329+ 0.0329+ 0.0329
(0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0252)
B chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of B=1 −0.0245 −0.0245 −0.0245
(0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0380)
Education of Resp. 0.00137 0.00137 0.00137
(0.00180) (0.00269) (0.00248)
Log Spending of Resp. −0.0211+ −0.0211 −0.0211
(0.0117) (0.0166) (0.0155)
Urban 0.0246 0.0246 0.0246
(0.0159) (0.0231) (0.0305)
Electrified −0.0484 −0.0484 −0.0484
(0.0539) (0.0733) (0.0853)
Ration card 0.0258+ 0.0258 0.0258
(0.0151) (0.0223) (0.0207)
Hours supplied of Resp. 0.00769∗∗∗ 0.00769∗∗ 0.00769∗∗
(0.00179) (0.00264) (0.00290)
Resp. Dalit caste −0.0511∗∗ −0.0511+ −0.0511+
(0.0191) (0.0268) (0.0273)
Resp. Hindu 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗ 0.0767∗
(0.0220) (0.0294) (0.0359)
Trust 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0240∗ 0.0240+
(0.00649) (0.00959) (0.0126)
Constant 2.284∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.165) (0.171)
N 6575 6575 6575
R2 0.015 0.015 0.015
Standard errors in parentheses
Column 1: Robust SE
Column 2: Cluster SE by Respondent
Column 3: Cluster SE by Resp, Village
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.13: Ordered Logit Results: Acceptability and Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
main




Dalit Caste of A=1 −0.223∗∗ −0.544∗∗ −0.104 −0.400+
(0.0792) (0.176) (0.0921) (0.231)
Rel. Sim of A=1 0.159+ 0.0444 −0.103 0.0713
(0.0952) (0.220) (0.101) (0.226)
Education of Resp. −0.00768 −0.0176 0.0131 0.0301
(0.0110) (0.0199) (0.0111) (0.0196)
Log Spending of Resp. −0.00132 0.0169 0.00637 −0.125
(0.0725) (0.126) (0.0694) (0.144)
Urban −0.00228 −0.0181 0.0421 0.268
(0.0892) (0.184) (0.145) (0.201)
Electrified −0.342 −0.410 −0.175 0.392
(0.352) (0.408) (0.346) (0.574)
Ration card −0.0564 −0.0274 0.0832 0.100
(0.0920) (0.193) (0.114) (0.196)
Hours supplied of Resp. −0.00349 0.00583 0.0368∗∗ 0.0314
(0.0101) (0.0236) (0.0126) (0.0208)
Resp. Dalit caste 0.0852 0.0883 −0.310∗ −0.355
(0.104) (0.249) (0.123) (0.230)
Resp. Hindu 0.0782 −0.0659 0.220 0.418
(0.126) (0.269) (0.181) (0.267)
Trust −0.0103 −0.0400 0.117∗ 0.164∗
(0.0377) (0.0809) (0.0562) (0.0806)




Abs. Income diff 0.00408
(0.0103)
Abs. Hours diff −0.00254
(0.0126)
Abs. Hours diff = 4 −0.156 −0.346
(0.0973) (0.350)
Abs. Hours diff = 8 0.00538 −0.0221
(0.123) (0.259)
Abs. Hours diff = 12 −0.155 −0.224
(0.192) (0.291)
A chosen=1 −0.182 −0.625∗
(0.130) (0.261)
A chosen=1 × Dalit Caste of A=1 0.0666 0.551
(0.142) (0.351)
A chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of A=1 0.269+ 0.144
(0.160) (0.304)
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Rel. Sim of B=1 0.00895 0.219
(0.159) (0.266)
B chosen=1 × Rel. Sim of B=1 0.0215 −0.424
(0.197) (0.334)
Abs. Income diff 0.00372
(0.0300)
Abs. Hours diff −0.0375
(0.0308)
Observations 2984 695 2984 695
Standard errors in parentheses
Columns 1-2: Outcome - Acceptability
Columns 3-4 - Outcome - Punishment
Columns 2 and 4 exclude all blanks in hours/income
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.14: Alternative-specific Mixed Logit Model of Acceptability
(1) (2)
Person Chosen
Income (1000s Rs) −0.183∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0322)















Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Conclusion
Aviation is a significant part of the global economy, accounting for 3.4-5% of world GDP,
and aviation activity is growing at 5-6% per year on average (Belobaba, 2016). In this
dissertation, I have contributed to the rigorous estimation of the positive spillovers due
to aviation connectivity, and in particular, estimated the impact of connectivity on
regional innovation within the United States using an instrumental variables approach.
At the same time, the aviation industry accounts for 2-3% of the global carbon
dioxide emissions and brings about significant air quality and health effects (Wuebbles
et al., 2007; Government Accountability Office, 2009; McCarthy, 2010; Yim et al., 2015;
Scha¨fer et al., 2016; Schlenker and Walker, 2016). Emerging works have elucidated some
of the feedback impacts climate change in turn bring to the aviation industry in the form
of increased turbulence frequency and intensity, longer transatlantic flight times, and
more weight-restricted days for hotter airports at high altitudes (Williams and Joshi,
2013; Williams, 2016; Coffel and Horton, 2015). In this dissertation, I have added a
first-order estimation of the potential damages possible in the form of additional delays
associated with more severe thunderstorm environments in the United States.
In the field of energy infrastructure development, I used a conjoint experiment to
examine the role of social norms in the persistence of electricity theft in Uttar Pradesh,
India, in order to better understand the obstacles to policy reform and realization on
the ground. The sustainability of aviation, and of infrastructure more broadly, presents
fertile grounds for new research, and there are many questions that remain, as I have
argued in this work.
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Returning to focus on aviation, there is perhaps comfort in some of the recent
actions taken at the international level. After prolonged inaction and a unilateral
attempt by the EU to include international aviation emissions into the ETS, ICAO
adopted Resolution A39-3 in 2016 to implement a global market-based measure called
the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) in
2016 that aims to achieve carbon neutral growth from 2020 (Price, 2009; Scott and
Rajamani, 2012; Ahmad, 2015). The essential goal of CORSIA is to achieve carbon
neutral growth from 2020 levels, where emissions above such levels have to be offset or
compensated elsewhere through other sectors or through offset projects. Monitoring,
reporting, and verification (MRV) mechanisms have just begun in 2019. The pilot
phase operates between 2021-2023 and the first phase from 2024-2026, both of which are
voluntary phases. From 2027 onwards, the scheme becomes mandatory for all signatory
states to ICAO unless they are exempted (ICAO, 2019b). As of 8 March 2019, 79 States,
representing 76.63% of international aviation activity, intend to voluntarily participate
in CORSIA from its outset (ICAO, 2019a).
However, only international aviation activities between participating states are ac-
counted for under CORSIA, and there are currently no plans to regulate domestic
aviation emissions within the United States. In addition, there are several issues raised
regarding the efficacy of CORSIA in achieving efficient levels of emissions abatement, as
offset prices are in the medium-term priced well-below the social cost of carbon (SCC)
(Winchester, 2017). For the sustainability of the aviation sector, and importantly for
it to play a role as a model sector for other industries to mimic, serious issues and
questions remain.
We live in the jet age today. As Davies (2011) would argue, we have already lived
through several jet ages. First, the short-haul jet era beginning in 1952; second, the
dawn of the wide-bodied jets like the Boeing 747 (dubbed the Queen of the Skies). We
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are living in the third jet age today, where jumbo jets like the Airbus 380 roam the skies
and new jets like the Boeing 787 Dreamliner are now made of composite materials (up
to 80%), rather than metal, and a potential return of the supersonic jet is in the news.
Davies, in his fantastic aviation history volume entitled Airlines of the Jet Age, ended
his book with this message, as he remembers a rail and fly journey from Frankfurt to
Cologne:
“Measurable improvements in air travel in the future can be achieved only
by innovative cooperation on the ground... When airlines and railroads cease
to compete, but energetically cooperate, and the policy of intermodality is
universally accepted, this could signal the advent of the fourth jet age.”
(Davies, 2011)
The concept of intermodality between aviation and other transportation sectors had
been entirely missing in this work, but indeed an important area of future research. As
we strive for more connectivity, we also need to study the potential for more inter-
modality. Otherwise, we may very well miss an opportunity to fundamentally change
the role of aviation in a sustainable future, and we will have to continue to ponder why
we choose to fly between New York and Washington, when instead we could be using
a transportation mode that has a lower impact on our environment.
I very much hope that the fourth jet age will arrive soon, and I hope that you and
I will both work towards realizing it. There’s much to be done.
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